

## ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation: AWAKENING ACTIVISM: THE POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS

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Individuals are an integral part of international human rights. While central to our leading theories of human rights change and to the efforts of human rights organizations in the real world, empirical scholarship has not systematically investigated how individuals choose to become advocates. Without the mobilization of individuals, human rights institutions and campaigns are deprived of the energy and material that fuel their success. In this dissertation, I closely evaluate the reasons why individuals choose to become engaged in human rights campaigns, what drives them to advocacy, and what this tells us about the relationship between political psychology and international human rights. In Chapter 1, I consider how incidental emotions influence individuals' support for child hunger relief and refugee assistance, finding that negative emotions like disgust tend to amplify pre-existing views. In Chapter 2, I evaluate the effects of the negativity bias and loss-aversion bias on support for child hunger relief. I find that the combination of negative imagery and gains-focused messaging had a significant and positive effect on individuals' support for both personal and

government action to help feed and house the hungry. In Chapter 3, I discuss the important effects that political ideology had on the relationships I observed in Chapters 1 and 2. I illustrate how those on the political left and right responded in systematically different ways in each of the experiments, and note how these differences reveal the critical importance of targeted messaging with an emphasis on ideology. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of these dissertation findings as theoretically important and practically useful, with an emphasis on a focused and practically-oriented future research agenda.

AWAKENING ACTIVISM: THE POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY OF  
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS

by

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## INTRODUCTION: Sea Slaves or Cecil the Lion?

On July 27<sup>th</sup>, 2015, news broke that hunters in Zimbabwe had illegally killed a beloved lion named “Cecil.” The story ignited an outrage of a truly global scale, with twitter mentions of #cecilthelion skyrocketing around the world. Two days after the news broke, Twitter still registered over 250,000 original tweets featuring the hashtag. Some of these original tweets were retweeted tens of thousands of times—one post by comedian Ricky Gervais was retweeted over 40,000 times. A petition calling for “Justice for Cecil” attracted 300,000 signatures. And the social media outcry was not without consequences. Zimbabwe instituted a ban on big game hunting near the park where the lion was shot. The US federal agency tasked with wildlife protection initiated an investigation into the lion’s alleged killer. A number of major airlines instituted a ban on the transport of animal trophies. Amid intense public pressure, the American dentist who shot the lion closed his practice.

To be sure, the killing of “Cecil” the lion was an important moment in the animal conservation movement. As one commentator remarked, it signaled a moment of reflection, where mankind re-evaluated its relationship with the natural world it inhabits. It was, indeed, a seminal moment. By way of comparison, on the same day that the “Cecil the lion” killing broke, the New York Times published a major exposé on the contemporary human slave trade in the Pacific. It described the practice of capturing and enslaving men, often for many years, to work on fishing boats. They describe how the disobedient were killed, beaten, or imprisoned below deck in atrocious conditions. The sick were often simply thrown overboard. The story “Sea Slaves’ The Human Misery that Feeds Pets and Livestock” was retweeted only 372 times, or more than 670 times less than the Lion story. It garnered only 363 comments on the NYT website. US corporations that profit from the animal and fish

feed generated by the slave ships were not subject to a fraction of the intense scrutiny and pressure that descended on the lion-killing dentist.

Why, specifically, would a story about rampant slavery, torture and murder for profit attract so little attention? Surely it would be wrong to suggest that the average person finds big game hunting, or other comparable outrages, more reprehensible than slavery and murder. Indeed, the NYT.com user comments on the slavery story are rife with demands for prompt action, and seemingly genuine horror and shock. But why was so much public pressure levied against the lion-killing dentist, with no analogue for the corporations making animal and pet food produced by modern-day slaves? Was the problem too complex? The situation too horrific? The solution too amorphous or difficult to identify? How does the political mind process information about these human rights tragedies, and what might explain how individuals respond, or fail to respond, when they are made aware of human rights abuses occurring around the globe? The objective of this dissertation is to find an empirical answer to this question, looking at the relationship of political psychology, action, and human rights abuse.

## 1. The State of the Literature

The rise of human rights campaigns by human rights organizations (HROs) during the twentieth century aimed to increase the degree to which average citizens paid attention to human rights around the globe. These campaigns, and the very existence of organizations like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, depend in large part on their ability to attract supporters to send donations, sign petitions, tweet, write letters on behalf of prisoners of conscience<sup>1</sup>, or even participate in nonviolent protests. However, while HROs and

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<sup>1</sup> See Amnesty International's "Write for Rights" Campaign: <http://write.amnestyusa.org/about/>

human rights campaigns more broadly often rely on individuals for support, empirical human rights scholarship has typically focused on “top-down” processes by which states, institutions, laws, IGOs, and NGOs affect to human rights outcomes (see Hafner-Burton 2012 for review, see also Cole 2005; 2009; 2011; Lebovic & Voeten 2006; Lupu & Voeten 2011; Hafner-Burton et al. 2011; Vreeland 2008). While most human rights scholarship has been focused on these higher-level issues, HROs “on the ground” have been working to identify the most effective ways to attract supporters to their cause—particularly because attracting committed supporters is often central to their chances of motivating change. Framing HRO campaign messages in the most persuasive way possible is central to attracting widespread and sustained support.

Furthermore, it is not only real-world HROs that prioritize citizen mobilization—our most prominent academic theories of human rights often do the same. Among the most widely cited theoretical explanations of the relationship between the global human rights regime and outcomes on the ground is Beth Simmons’ (2009) “Mobilizing for Human Rights,” which won the 2010 Book of the Year Award from the International Studies Association and, according to Google Scholar, has been cited over 1,400 times. In this landmark work, Simmons argues that human rights law and institutions create change primarily by empowering individuals and groups within rights-abusing states. Authoritarian and other rights-abusing states sign-on to human rights covenants and treaties with the hopes of gaining international legitimacy, with little intention of changing their domestic-level behavior. Instead, Simmons argues, individuals and groups at the domestic level treat these signatures as commitments to which the government is beholden. While hoping to gain legitimacy themselves, rights-abusing states instead confer legitimacy to domestic

victims of human rights abuse when they join the plethora of treaties, covenants, and courts within the global human rights regime.

Another deeply influential, widely-cited model for how HROs affect state behavior is the “transnational advocacy network” (TAN), originally developed in Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) “Activists Beyond Borders,” which has been cited over 13,400 times according to Google Scholar. In brief, Keck and Sikkink built a theory that connected the success or failure of human rights campaigns to the interaction of international HROs with civil societies and civic organizations at the domestic level, which joined together to put pressure on states from “above” (at the international level) and “below” (at the domestic level) to improve their human rights practices. Using a series of in-depth case studies, they show that international HROs connect donors and activists in wealthy, democratic states with individuals and civil society groups within rights-abusing states. This network of HROs and activists both within and outside of the rights-abusing state applies pressure on the government in a way that can compel change.

Domestic audiences and civil society, composed of citizens, hold a central place in these two prominent mid-range theories of human rights, but they are largely missing in empirical human rights scholarship. Our theories emphasize citizen mobilization, but empirical scholarship has not. How might new information cause an individual to ultimately engage in behavior aimed at the improvement of human rights? On this issue, we know very little. This, in my view, presents an opportunity for us to understand why certain human rights campaigns, and certain human rights claims, are effective in garnering support and action, while many others fail.

Although some empirical research has examined the role of individuals, it typically relied primarily on survey data to show correlations between static personality characteristics and human rights attitudes (Cohrs, Maes, Moschner, and Kielmann 2007, Getz 1985; Moghaddam and Vuksanovic 1990; McFarland and Mathews 2005). With the exception of occasional, recent experimental work (McEntire, Leiby, and Krain 2015), empirical human rights research has largely ignored how individual support and advocacy for human rights may shift and change in response to new information. In order to build an understanding of the relationship between the content of human rights campaigns and individual action, we should consider how “information” about human rights abuse relates to aspects of individuals’ political psychology.

Among the primary functions of many human rights organizations, both IGOs (such as the UN Human Rights Commission) and NGOs (such as Amnesty International) is the collection and dissemination of information. The purpose of this information is not simply historical or archival, but rather to create an impetus for action, to compel those with power, whether they be courts, political elites, or the mass public, to take action on behalf of a human rights claim. As Hafner- Burton (2012) aptly explains, “[i]n order for regimes to socialize or persuade people into upholding human rights, they must convey some new information that changes people's beliefs about the value and appropriateness of their actions.” Thus, a new research agenda, the beginnings of which are outlined in this dissertation, should focus on the dynamics of rights-related information, namely, how this information is processed, understood, and ultimately acted upon (dismissed or otherwise) by individuals.

In this dissertation, I focus on the ways in which individuals respond to information about rights abuses occurring in foreign states. This approach borrows from Keck and Sikkink's work, where audiences *outside* of the rights-abusing state are recruited and targeted by HROs as key stakeholders in the attempt to motivate change. The theoretical model of the "transnational advocacy network," discussed above, locates these external advocates as critical for applying pressure from "above" the target state in conjunction with domestic audiences doing the same from "below" (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; Murdie and Davis 2012). For these reasons, I argue, the study of individual views on human rights policy within advanced democracies--and how those views may change--may contribute significantly to our understanding of the global human rights regime. The study of individual differences may provide a fruitful ground for future research on the relationship between human rights organizations, domestic audiences, and human rights outcomes on the ground.

## 1.2. Individuals and International Human Rights Organizations

When it comes to the normative framework of the international system, human rights stand alone as the most prominent source of ideas and moral justifications for actions that limit traditional notions of sovereignty and economic efficiency. Posner (2014) writes that since the 1940s, mentions of human rights in English-language books have increased 200-fold, and that "human rights" are mentioned 100 times more than other types of rights (e.g. constitutional rights). While human rights language has been central to the international system since at least the 1970s (cf. Amnesty International's Nobel Prize in 1977), it was the extraordinary growth in the number of NGOs during the 1990s which truly signaled that the language of human rights had been appropriated from the state-centric United Nations and reclaimed by international civil society (Baylis, Smith, and Owens 2014). Observing this



trend, political scientists have since written extensively on the relationships between the state, domestic populations, NGOs, IGOs, and international human rights (Hafner-Burton 2012 for review). International Relations research on international human rights has grown considerably over the last two decades to become an established subcategory of research in the field.

While human rights as established in the Universal Declaration of 1945 were fully embedded in the state-centric structure of the UN, in the 1970s groups like Amnesty International (AI) began to turn the focus back towards civil society. AI and other human rights organizations (HROs) used the language of rights not just to put pressure on states, but (perhaps more commonly) to call on citizens in liberal, developed countries to take an active role in defending those whose rights were under threat around the world. These HROs were engaged primarily in what historian Samuel Moyn (2010) calls “philanthropic humanitarianism,” where NGOs rely on and utilize citizens to write checks, file lawsuits, join boycotts, hold vigils, or engage in other individual actions. This is the top-down, external pressure to which the TAN model refers. According to AI’s website, for example, the “overwhelming majority” of the funds it uses to engage in its various activities around the world come not from states or even foundations, but from individuals. Funds are often raised for targeted campaigns, where the viability of the action is contingent on the availability of funds. The World Food Programme, for example, raises money from individuals for specific, concrete actions such as drought relief in Tanzania or refugee assistance in Syria. AI also regularly relies on individuals for actions other than just donating. During its annual “Write for Rights” campaign, hundreds of thousands of individuals write targeted letters for the release of select political prisoners (over 3 million letters were written in 2014). While the specific effects of these campaigns are not always immediately clear, their

impact is increasingly well-established (Hafner-Burton 2008, 2014; Keck & Sikkink 1998; Cohen & Green 2012). For example, campaigns directed by human rights organizations have been found to impact the deployment of peacekeepers (Murdie and Peksen 2014). Boycotting campaigns have led to changes in corporate behavior and corporate regulation (Seidman 2007). Applying pressure from outside of the target state through coordinated human rights campaigns which recruit individuals from wealthy industrial democracies is at the core of what HROs do and how their actions lead to change.

While HROs often rely on individuals for support, empirical human rights scholarship has instead focused on higher-level questions regarding the more typical actors in international relations, such as states, laws, and global or regional institutions (Moore 1998; Davenport 2007; Hafner-Burton 2008; Conrad and Moore 2010; Murdie and Peksen 2014). Again, while this body of quantitative and qualitative research has contributed greatly to our understanding of the global human rights regime, it leaves out a careful examination of the interaction of individuals with human rights campaigns. Given that individuals play a key role in the practical efforts of HROs and in prominent academic theories of human rights change (Simmons 2009; Keck & Sikkink 1998), might variations in how HR campaigns motivate individuals be an important piece of the causal puzzle? More specifically, does the content of HR campaigns have any systematic effect on the attitudes and behaviors of individuals? Answering that question is the primary motivation behind this dissertation and the broader research agenda outlined here.

## 2. Applying the Dual-process Theory of Mind to Human Rights Messaging

At their core, human rights campaigns are about survival. Survival can be threatened in obvious ways—when a regime, rebel group, or MNC is accused of killing or maiming—or in less obvious ways—when workers are paid below subsistence levels, when the safety of

workers is disregarded, when the environment is slowly made uninhabitable, when our autonomy is subject to state control, or when a culture or identity is erased from existence. Human rights seek to protect from destruction the things that make us who we are, the things that allow our bodies, our autonomy, and identities to survive.

We know that these types of political issues, those dealing with physical, sexual, and psychological abuses of the body, family, and group, including issues that involve disease, malnutrition, death, bodily harm and/or disfigurement, are deeply connected to reflexive, automatic processes in the brain. When the western world was exposed to the horrifying image of Alan Kurdi<sup>2</sup>, a 3-year old Syrian refugee whose corpse was found washed-up on a beach in Turkey, it struck a deep chord. Many news websites, such as Reuters, warned users about the graphic content of the photos before showing them, and Facebook was criticized for deleting a related photo album and the more than 130,000 “shares” of the images within.<sup>3</sup> In cases like Alan’s, our first instinct is often to turn away in disgust, shame, or fear. Images like his can activate what is sometimes referred to as our “fight or flight” reflex. In short, human rights issues often speak to the “old” parts of our brain concerned with survival, avoidance of disease, decay, gore, injury, and death.

In this dissertation, I draw on the “dual process model” in psychology to argue that these reflexive, automatic responses to human rights campaign information help to explain why and how individuals do (or do not) change their attitudes and behaviors to become active supporters of rights issues. While there isn’t space here to cover the ongoing and multifaceted debate within cognitive psychology about the dual-process model, an

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<sup>2</sup> <http://time.com/4162306/alan-kurdi-syria-drowned-boy-refugee-crisis/>

<sup>3</sup> <http://theconversation.com/dont-look-away-from-aylan-kurdis-image-47069>

established consensus holds that our minds perceive the world around us using both “old” and “new” cognitive systems.

The “old” part of our brains, often simply called “System 1,” harkens back to our days in the Pleistocene, or before that, when the world was much more dangerous and survival more uncertain. As Kahneman (2011, pp. 20) writes, System 1 “operates automatically and quickly, with little or no effort and sense of voluntary control.” System 1 functions in the limbic portion of our brains, the “old, animal” part of our brains, designed to protect us from threats, keep us together in groups that keep us safe, and help us produce viable offspring. The limbic portion of our brain produces emotions, feelings, so-called “gut reactions,” and reflexes. It’s also the part of our brain that tells our lungs to breathe and our heart to beat—as well as our legs to run when see a predator. Its goal is to keep us alive, and make sure our genes get passed on.

System 2 thinking, by way of contrast, occurs in the neocortex, the massive region of the brain that makes us uniquely human. This is the part of the brain that produces speech, deliberative thinking, logic, and reason. Unlike System 1’s fast, effortless, and decisive operation, System 2 thinking is slow, requires effort, and is often indecisive. System 2 thinking involves the deployment of “rationality,” the deliberate application of rules or other decision criteria over which we have ostensive control. Khaneman (2011, pp. 21) writes that it “allocates attention to the effortful mental activities that demand it, including complex computations. The operations of System 2 are often associated with the subjective experience of agency, choice, and concentration.”

While conventional wisdom assumes that System 2 is the thing most of us are using most of the time when we make decisions, Kahneman (2011) argues that System 1 is actually

doing the vast majority of the work—and “thinking”—for us. System 2’s function, he argues, is often to tack on a post-hoc justification for whatever it is that System 1 already decided, and what we already did as a result.

With respect to the way we think and react to human rights information, there are reasons to suspect that System 1 may play even more of a role than usual. While the decision of what dishwasher to buy, what college to attend, or what book to read next, may seem fairly divorced from our Pleistocene-age survival instincts, our reaction to an image of a dead child on the beach seems less so. The same could be true for a host of common human rights issues like malnutrition, untreated disease, extrajudicial killing, torture, abuse, and rape. System 1 likely dominates the minds of those forced to live through such abuses, but might it also dominate the reactions of those far away, exposed to an email, billboard, or commercial from Amnesty International in a safe and healthy environment? This dissertation tackles this question directly.

### 3. Theory and Overview of Chapters


A full theory of the behavioral and psychological responses to human rights information is the ultimate goal of the research agenda sketched out here, and in other work I have completed with co-authors over the last several years. A small but growing cottage industry of political scientists and human rights scholars has begun to develop innovative and new approaches that, should the work continue to be embraced by the discipline through publications and conferences, will bring human rights scholarship closer to this ultimate goal.

In this dissertation, I hope to provide a solid foundation upon which to build this future work. Given the arguments I’ve outlined above, my goal in this project is to provide a

thorough account of the ways in which System 1 thinking and cognition contribute to changes in individual beliefs and intended behaviors with respect to human rights issues. In section 5 of this chapter, I discuss the ways in which I think this research has the potential to contribute not just to the academic literature, but also to practically-focused endeavors outside the confines of the academic journal.

In the sections above, I have argued that the automatic, fast, and decisive cognitive processes of System 1 are likely to have a significant influence on the ways in which individuals process and ultimately act upon human rights information. In Figure 1 below, I outline how I envision emotions and other known cognitive biases contribute to changes in individual decisions and beliefs with respect to human rights. The goal of this dissertation is to uncover and elaborate the ways in which System 1 thinking—illustrated by the blue boxes in Figure 1—contributes directly to changes in belief and intended action on human rights issues. The empirical chapters describe our automatic, reflexive reactions when presented with information designed to motivate action on behalf of a human rights claim. Figure 1 illustrates how the research described in this dissertation, in addition to our existing knowledge regarding System 1 thinking, contributes to our understanding of the ways in which instinctual reactions contribute to individual engagement with human rights campaigns.

Figure 1



In Chapter 1, I describe some of the well-established ways in which emotions have been found to influence our political beliefs. In some cases, a particular stimulus or situation can arouse an emotional response, and that response contributes to our reaction to that particular stimulus/situation. In the literature, this is referred to as “integral emotion,” or emotion that arises from and helps to determine the response to a given situation. For example, being corrected by a superior at work might make a person angry, and that anger might influence how they respond to the correction. By contrast, “incidental emotion” refers to the residual effects of emotion, or the ways in which an emotional state can affect our reaction to unrelated situations. Using the same example, the anger a person experiences at being corrected at work might influence the way she treats her husband when she gets home—an unrelated situation. Incidental emotions help us understand the direct relationship between emotional states and subsequent behavior, by distancing the emotion from its original, potentially confounding cause. Drawing on the work of Jennifer Lerner and others, I designed a survey experiment in which I engender emotions in participants using an established method that is wholly unrelated to human rights. Following the emotion elicitation procedure, I describe two human rights issues to participants and ask them to describe their beliefs and intended behaviors with respect to the issue. By measuring the incidental effect that the elicited emotional state has on the responses that participants provide, I am able to measure the independent effect of emotional dispositions on individuals’ responses to human rights information. Taken together, I find that negative emotions, particularly anger, disgust, and sadness, may amplify existing attitudes—whether supportive or not—and make intended action more likely.

In Chapter 2, I move on from System 1 emotions and turn to well-established System 1 biases. The first of these is the so-called “negativity bias,” a psychological



predisposition which draws individuals to negative stimuli over positive, or neutral stimuli. Citing public health and environmental research in this area, I argue that the use of negative imagery in human rights messaging is likely to be more effective than alternatives in both drawing the focused attention of individuals and in motivating action. However, I note the existence of research warning that negativity and negative imagery can lead to disengagement and apathy when not combined with a message explaining the immediate possibility of efficacious action. To identify a potential source of such a message, I turn the second System 1 bias in this chapter: loss-aversion. Drawing on Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) "prospect theory," loss aversion captures the predilection individuals have to prefer the avoidance of losses over the attainment of gains. Using a nationally-representative US sample, I compare the effects of positive and negative imagery combined with gain and loss messages on participants' beliefs and intended behaviors regarding a specific human rights issue. Ultimately, I find strong support that negative imagery and, surprisingly, gains-focused messages have a significant and consistently positive influence on pro-human rights beliefs and intended behaviors.

Finally, in Chapter 3 I step back from "universal" System 1 features to discuss and evaluate the degree to which variations in emotions and biases between individuals can help to explain differences in how individuals respond to human rights information. An established and growing body of literature in political science finds that individuals' political ideology is closely correlated with differences in the degree and intensity with which incidental emotions affect subsequent decisions. Similarly, individuals of different political ideologies are found to exhibit systematic differences in the negativity bias, and other System 1 factors not obviously related to politics. In this chapter, I return to the experiments in Chapters 1 and 2, as well as other work I have co-authored in this area, to consider how

differences in political ideology affected the results. I find that political liberals and conservatives differ (unsurprisingly) in their baseline attitudes about human rights, but also—more interestingly—in the intensity and direction of their responses to new human rights information. Political ideology thus serves as a useful proxy for systematic differences in the ways individuals are predisposed to experience System 1 thinking. Ultimately, I find that political conservatives are particularly moved to express pro-human rights beliefs and intended behaviors when emotionally disgusted, and particularly when negative imagery and avoid-loss messages are used. Political liberals, by contrast, are motivated to express such attitudes by a wider array of stimuli, but most reliably when exposed to the personal narratives of suffering victims.

#### 4. Conclusion: Broader Purposes of the Dissertation

This dissertation has a practical focus. While the research conducted here addresses a gap in the academic understanding of how HR campaigns work, an equally-important goal is to develop the beginnings of a research agenda that contributes beyond the confines of theory.

The findings I outline in the three subsequent chapters improve our understanding of how to effectively promote human rights. Despite heavy investment in the promotion of human rights by states and other groups, we know very little about how to effectively promote engagement with human rights issues. First, learning how to use information about human rights to engage the public has clear economic benefits. The U.S. State Department FY2015 allocation for “Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance” was \$2.47 billion alone. Billions of dollars are spent each year on human rights promotion by organizations such as USAID, Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty International. The stated purpose of many of these campaigns is to build “awareness” and/or to encourage people to take certain

actions such as donating, volunteering, or boycotting. This dissertation lays the foundation for an improved understanding of how these “awareness” efforts are processed, understood, and ultimately acted upon. Through this, we might better understand how to allocate resources to bring similar levels of attention to “Sea Slaves” as there were for “Cecil the Lion.”

Furthermore, understanding how to more effectively promote human rights necessarily benefits minority and underrepresented communities—a central focus of HROs the world over. Human rights abuses often, if not typically, involve minority communities, such as refugees or immigrants. These communities are, unsurprisingly, often the most regular targets of human rights abuse. Among the most difficult tasks that human rights promotion efforts face are convincing individuals to care for and act to defend the rights of people who might not look, speak, believe, or act in ways that are familiar. This dissertation provides tools to make that task less challenging. By uncovering how human rights information connects with established cognitive biases, I hope to contribute to new “best practices” for developing human rights information that is more difficult for individuals to dismiss. The benefits of learning what moves people to care about the rights of these underrepresented communities are clear.

Finally, a central motivation for this project was born from my experience as an educator, and my hope is that these findings have clear implications for human rights educators. High school social studies and history teachers, undergraduate instructors of international relations, history, political science, and others often face the difficult task of engaging students on the subject of human rights. This research could be used to develop curriculums and study materials designed to maximize student engagement with these topics.

By building a deeper understanding of the psychology behind human rights promotion, study materials could be developed to draw students in, capture their attention, and present information in such a way that genuine engagement, rather than apathy, is encouraged. This could help to develop students more committed to advocacy, more cognizant of rights abuses that have occurred at home and abroad, and more engrossed in that aspect of their education.

## CHAPTER 1: Emotions and Human Rights

### 1. Introduction

In the introductory chapter, I discussed the difference between System 1 and System 2 thinking. System 2 is characterized by slow, deliberate thinking, and is understood to be the source of “rationality,” or the careful weighing of preferences with anticipated costs and benefits. In this chapter, I consider that aspect of our psychology often thought to be reason’s antonym: emotion. While research has shown that the apparent opposition between reason and emotion is a false dichotomy (c.f. Mercer 2010; Nussbaum 2001), there is nonetheless something fundamentally involuntary about emotion. It arises whether we want it to or not, and it affects our decisions and behaviors without our “executive” control. While our emotions can be processed, acted upon, modified, and interpreted by the System 2 aspects of our psychology, in some cases emotions themselves can have an independent, non-conscious effect on our decisions and behavior (Lerner, Valdesolo, & Kassam 2015; Small & Lerner 2008; Reus-Smit 2014). When emotions function in this way, they represent a System 1 process having a direct effect on behavior. These are called “incidental emotions.” How might incidental emotions affect individuals’ response to information and messaging from HROs?

In this chapter, I argue that the incidental emotions of anger and disgust are likely to have independent effects on human rights attitudes and intended behaviors. To test this argument, I conducted a survey experiment using an online convenience sample of about 1,200 subjects. Subjects were randomly assigned into 5 groups, and each group was primed to experience either anger, disgust, sadness, happiness, or a baseline (neutral) condition. Following the prime, subjects were asked to begin a separate study—described as unrelated to the emotion task—where they were provided information about both child hunger and

the global refugee crisis. After reading some basic facts about these rights issues, they were surveyed on their intended behaviors and beliefs about them. Ultimately, disgust was found to have a significant influence on beliefs and intended behaviors regarding hunger, whereas anger was found to have a significant influence on beliefs and intended behaviors regarding refugees. Nonetheless, these effects were found to be heavily contingent on the political ideology of the participants, an effect that will be explored in greater detail in Chapter 3.

## 2. Overview and Hypotheses

A growing body of research in moral psychology and attitudinal science finds that our moral values may be both born from and shaped by emotion. If the same is true for human rights values, this stands in contrast to dominant views in philosophy and political science, which treat the mass appeal of rights either as the historical consequence of power, the product of careful legal scholarship, or as arising from fundamentally “cerebral” or “rational” philosophy. I argue that human rights support, while no doubt tied to our other political views and beliefs, is ultimately the product of a *felt* response to human abuse.<sup>4</sup> This study is unique in that it uses proven techniques to elicit emotion in a laboratory setting, which allows us to measure the effect of specific, distinct emotional states on levels of support for human rights.

Furthermore, this study is unique in that it measures the effect of “incidental” emotion on intended behaviors and beliefs regarding human rights. Incidental emotions are emotions that we might feel in our personal life—something we saw on the news, something our partner said or did, a song we heard that struck an emotional chord—but that come to

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<sup>4</sup> For example, in an unpublished study, Steve Arves and I found that different philosophical, legal, and practical arguments against the use of torture were indistinguishable from one another in terms of their overall effect on attitudes (Arves and Braun, 2015 working paper).

affect seemingly unrelated decisions and behaviors (Dasgupta, et al. 2009; Schmeichel & Inzlicht 2013). For example, a political science graduate student may become angry because of something he saw on the news about the president, and this may make his driving more aggressive. In these types of cases, the effect of the emotion is merely incidental. The emotion itself is causing changes in behavior, rather than the event that triggered it. Incidental emotion is contrasted with so-called “integral” emotions, which are emotions that are felt within the immediate context of what caused them. For example, if the same angry graduate student were to have written an angry letter to the President after hearing the upsetting newscast, the effect of the emotion on the content of the letter would be “integral.” In a clear causal progression, the event (newscast) caused both the emotion (anger) and the response (angry letter).

In short, studying the effects of incidental emotions allows us to measure the direct effect of emotion on the behavioral outcome of interest—in our case, human rights attitudes and behaviors. Furthermore, there is considerable evidence to suggest that certain emotions are likely to have a greater influence on individual human rights attitudes than others. Two negative emotions that have received significant attention in terms of their relationship to political values are disgust and anger (Lerner, et al. 2015 for a recent review). It’s my belief that these emotions are particularly relevant to the broad objective of this dissertation—which is to shed light on how different types of information affect pro-human rights beliefs and actions. For example, one could argue that stories of suffering, such as those of victims of human trafficking in Myanmar, are especially effective in evoking feelings of sadness and anger. By contrast, ISIS videos of mass beheadings and other forms of bodily torture may be especially effective in evoking what has been referred to as “animal reminder disgust,” or a special type of disgust associated with bodily deformation. Previous research supplies us with

good reason to suspect that these different emotional responses may be systematically related to different beliefs and attitudes regarding the rights of those involved in the abuse and the degree to which action is required to protect them. In this chapter, I argue that the incidental emotions of anger and disgust are likely to have independent, positive effects on human rights attitudes and intended behaviors.

A significant body of literature now locates the “disgust” response as a key predictor of both moral and political values (Inbar, et al. 2012; Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley 2008; Ahn, et al. 2014). In this literature, different variations of affective disgust have been found to be central for the formation of powerful moral and political attitudes. Disgust has been shown to influence seemingly unrelated economic decisions (Lerner, Small, & Loewenstein 2004), attitudes on same-sex marriage (Adams, Stewart, & Blanchar 2014; Smith, et al. 2014), and even the environment (Feinberg & Willer 2013). I hypothesize that human rights support, like other moral and political beliefs, may be systematically related to the disgust response. In the experiment I describe below, participants primed to feel certain emotions are exposed to information about both the global refugee crisis and the epidemic of global hunger. Following each vignette, they are presented with a series of questions querying their beliefs and intended behaviors.

I include a vignette on global hunger because I think it provides a unique test of the effects of the disgust response. Hunger, or at least the consequences of it, can be “disgusting.” Hunger can lead to disease, disfigurement of the body, death, and other ailments. Previous research on disgust has found that these types of consequences—those dealing with the flesh—can lead to a “disposal” effect (Han, Lerner, & Zeckhauser 2012). When primed to feel disgust, individuals show an increased willingness to dispose of things,



even things unrelated to the initial experience of the emotion. One possible way to “dispose” of child hunger, it seems, is to simply ignore it, to stop thinking about it, to do nothing. However, this view may be incongruous with individuals’ existing moral and political beliefs (System 2). In order to remain at least somewhat consistent with existing beliefs that we shouldn’t allow children to starve, one way to “dispose” of the information regarding childhood hunger is to commit to doing something—to click the link to donate in the email from the World Food Programme, for example. For this reason, I offer my first hypothesis:

**H1:** The incidental experience of disgust will lead to more positive human rights beliefs and intended behaviors on the issue of global hunger, increasing the likelihood of support for actions to relieve hunger and willingness to act when compared to those not experiencing disgust.

On the issue of refugees, I suspect that disgust will have less of a significant impact, if any. The morality of accepting refugees is, at least in principle, less certain than the morality of saving hungry children, despite the fact that the two things are often effectively the same. For those primed to experience incidental disgust, the appropriate way to “dispose” of the information on refugees is likely to be more contingent on subjects’ preexisting political beliefs—a topic I turn to in Chapter 3. On the issue of refugees, however, I hypothesize that anger will have a significant influence on the human rights beliefs and behaviors of individuals. The effect of anger on political attitudes is, to a somewhat lesser degree than disgust, well-established in the literature. In an exhaustive and original review, Banks (2014) demonstrates that emotional anger predicts racialized political attitudes in the United States. In one experiment, for example, Banks finds that priming individuals to feel anger can “activate” their racial prejudice, bringing it to fore and allowing

it to have a more observable, direct impact on their judgements and behaviors. Similarly, Small & Lerner (2008), in one of many investigations of emotions' effect on political attitudes, find that incidental anger led subjects to decrease the amount of welfare offered to a single mother living in poverty. Other studies of anger in the international relations literature have found that it may explain the behavior of states in certain international crises, and may even independently explain the escalation of certain conflicts (see Hall 2011 for review).

I hypothesize that the emotion of anger will have a negative effect on support for policy and intended actions benefitting refugees. The argument for anger is straightforward—the literature described above reveals that anger can lead to more punitive political policy preferences. As Forgas (2003) and Small & Lerner (2008) argue, experiencing a particularly negative emotion like anger can lead one to “project” that negativity onto seemingly unrelated things. Small and Lerner write “negative valence associated with these emotions will carry over and elicit negative (i.e., mood congruent) feelings toward potential recipients” (151). While this effect may be small and insignificant when it comes to hungry children, it may be more pronounced on the issue of refugees. This leads to my second hypothesis:

**H2:** The incidental experience of anger will lead to more punitive human rights beliefs and intended behaviors on the issue of refugee migration, decreasing the likelihood of support and willingness to act when compared to those not experiencing anger.

### 3. Research Design

To evaluate the above hypotheses, I conducted a survey experiment using Amazon's Mechanical Turk (Mturk) platform. Mturk is a subject recruitment service which provides


researchers with a convenience sample of participants that is more diverse and more representative of the US population than other typical convenience samples, such as undergraduate students (Berinsky et al. 2012; Paolacci, Chandler, and Ipeirotis 2010). The sample of 1,240 participants was 57% female, 59% politically liberal, 73% below the age of 44, and 76% described themselves as white/Caucasian.

The design of the experiment roughly correlates with the approach used by Small & Lerner (2008). At the beginning of the experiment, subjects are informed that they will be participating in two unrelated studies. The first study includes the emotion induction task, and the second study includes the vignettes about hunger and refugees, as well as the dependent variables and control variables. The purpose of describing the two studies as separate—when they are in fact one study—is to conceal from subjects that the emotion induction task is intended to affect the subsequent responses. This approach was used successfully by Small & Lerner (2008), and the results for this experiment do not indicate that subjects were aware of the relationship between the two studies.

After consenting to the experiment, subjects complete a written emotion induction task. Following Banks (2008), Small & Lerner (2008), Lerner, Small, & Loewenstein (2004), and others, the task asks subjects to write about a personal experience that made them feel a certain way, and to do so in such a way that someone reading it might feel that way. There are 5 variations of the writing prompt, each corresponding to 1) anger, 2) disgust, 3) sadness, 4) happiness, or 5) a neutral condition. The neutral condition was achieved by asking subjects to write about what they do on a typical evening. Again following Banks (2008), immediately above the writing prompt, subjects also view a photograph of a human face making the “expression” associated with the emotion they are being asked to write about.

This method of emotion elicitation has been found to be particularly effective in creating the desired emotional state in the subject. The particular photographs of facial expressions were borrowed from Olszanowski, et al. (2015), who evaluated several sets of images and their associated features to identify an “ideal set” of expressive faces. Figure 1 displays what subjects in the “anger” condition viewed during the experiment.

**Figure 1: Anger Induction Task**



“Here is a picture of someone who is ANGRY. We would like you to describe in general things that make you feel like the person in the picture. Please write at least 3 to 5 sentences, but feel free to write more. It is okay if you don't remember all the details, just be specific about what exactly it is that makes you ANGRY and what it feels like to be ANGRY. Please describe the events that make you feel the MOST ANGRY, these experiences could have occurred in the past or will happen in the future. (Examples of things you might write about include: being treated unfairly by someone, being insulted or offended, etc.) If you can, write your description so that someone reading it might even feel ANGRY.”

Why include sadness and happiness conditions if my hypotheses turn on the effects of disgust and anger? In short, these function as quasi-control conditions. By including sadness, I assure that, in the event that both anger and disgust have similar significant effects, I can rule out the possibility that *any* negatively-valenced emotion has an effect. Unlike anger and disgust, which produce automatic, System 1-type effects, sadness is a more reflective emotion (Small & Lerner 2008), and can lead to different sorts of more deliberate judgements. As such, I do not expect it to have an effect comparable to anger or disgust.

Similarly, happiness is included in the induction conditions to assure that, in the event that anger, disgust, and sadness all have significant effects, I can rule out the possibility that *any* emotion, with a positive or negative valence, or my induction task in general, is leading to significant effects.

The 5 different emotional conditions function as the independent variables in this study. After being randomly assigned into one of the 5 emotional conditions and completing the induction task, subjects were informed that Study 1 was complete, and they would now begin Study 2. Study 2 begins with a vignette about child hunger (or refugees—the presentation order was randomized), explaining basic facts about hunger around the world. No emotive words or images were used—only plain statistics about hunger. After reading the vignette, subjects respond to 5 survey questions about how they might respond to the information. These are the first 5 of our dependent variables:

Q1: (Adapted from Small & Lerner (2008): “The US government spends about \$28 billion on foreign aid to reduce poverty and hunger around the world. Each year, Congress has the option to increase this amount, decrease it, or keep it about the same. What would you recommend to your own Congressman?”

Maximize spending on hunger-related foreign aid  
Substantially increase spending to \$35 billion, a 25% increase  
Moderately increase spending to \$31 billion, a 10% increase  
Keep spending levels about the same  
Moderately decrease spending to \$25 billion, a 10% decrease  
Substantially decrease spending to \$21 billion, a 25% decrease  
Eliminate spending on hunger-related foreign aid

The next 4 variables are answered via a 7-point agree/disagree scale:

Q2) “I would be willing to sign a petition calling on Congress and the United Nations to spend more funds providing relief for childhood hunger around the world.”

Q3) “I would be willing to help raise funds to provide relief for childhood hunger around the world, whether by asking friends and family to donate or by organizing a fundraiser.”

Q4) “Even if it meant slightly raising taxes or taking funds from other programs, I would support efforts by the US Government to help relieve childhood hunger around the world.”

Q5) “I believe that every child has a fundamental human right to sufficient food and water.”

The same procedure is repeated, but with statistics about refugees and analogous questions about refugees. The first of the 5 dependent variable questions about refugees follows the same structure as the hunger question (Q1 above), but the increase/decrease is in the number of refugees admitted to the US, rather than an increase/decrease in funding for global hunger. Whether subjects first viewed the hunger vignette and associated questions or the refugee vignette and associated questions was randomized, but all subjects saw both vignettes and answered all 10 dependent variable questions. Finally, a series of demographic questions including political ideology, age, gender, income, education level, and political knowledge were collected. Subjects were compensated for their participation.

#### 4. Results

None of these demographic categories were statistically correlated with any of the experimental groups, indicating that random assignment to the 5 emotion induction conditions was successful. As expected, the effect of the emotional conditions was different for the 5 poverty DVs and the 5 refugee DVs. Within the poverty DVs, results were roughly consistent, and the same was true within the refugee DVs. However, a peculiar finding repeated itself throughout the analyses—political ideology was having an inordinately large effect on the coefficients for nearly all of the 10 DVs. To illustrate this, Table 1 provides an

overview of findings for the first “hunger” DV. Recall that this question asked subjects the degree to which they think spending on hunger relief should be increased or decreased, on a 7-point scale. Lower numbers (1-3) represent increases, and higher numbers (5-7) indicate decreases.

Several analyses were performed on each of the dependent variables, and all showed roughly the same results. For the “hunger-funding” question below, using ordered logit, ANOVA/ANOVCA, or simple OLS regression all reveal that the “disgust” treatment group outperformed the rest, at least when ideology was not included as a control variable. Because OLS regression allows for easy interpretation both with and without control variables, results using this method are reported in the following Tables.

**Table 1:** Increase/decrease hunger funding?

VARIABLES	(Model 1)	(Model 2)	(Model 3)
	Hngr Fund	Hngr Fund	Hngr Fund
Neutral / Constant	4.802*** (0.0886)	5.064*** (0.224)	5.959*** (0.231)
Anger	0.103 (0.127)	0.0775 (0.129)	0.0783 (0.125)
Disgust	-0.236* (0.127)	-0.233* (0.129)	-0.170 (0.124)
Sadness	0.0409 (0.128)	0.0135 (0.130)	0.0921 (0.125)
Happiness	-0.0562 (0.125)	-0.0367 (0.127)	-0.0160 (0.121)
Age		-0.0371 (0.0323)	0.00730 (0.0312)
Income		-0.0398** (0.0189)	-0.0140 (0.0183)
Education		0.0310 (0.0343)	-0.00861 (0.0330)
Women		0.173** (0.0833)	0.0887 (0.0801)
Pol. Knowledge		-0.0955 (0.120)	-0.119 (0.116)
Race (white)		-0.184* (0.0974)	-0.0993 (0.0942)
Ideology			-0.303*** (0.0272)
Observations	1,240	1,206	1,161
R-squared	0.006	0.019	0.111

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Notice that, in Table 1 the disgust condition is significant in Model 1 ( $p=0.064$ ) and in Model 2 ( $p=0.071$ ), and its effects are negative. This means that individuals feeling disgusted were, in-fact, statistically more likely than individuals in the control condition to support *decreases* in funding for global hunger relief, not increases as I argued in hypothesis 1.



However, in Model 3, we see that much of this result may be driven by political ideology. In fact, political ideology had the largest substantive effect of any variable in Model 3. I investigate this result more closely in Chapter 3.

The remaining 4 variables in the hunger scenario all exhibited a similar pattern. When ideology is included as a control variable, the significance of the disgust variable disappears. As I discuss further in Chapter 3, the effect of disgust was pronounced in conservatives, leading them to support decreases in funding for child hunger, but there was little evidence of a disgust effect on liberals. Instead, disgust only motivated liberals to report higher levels of agreement with a personal intention to help organize fundraisers in their community to help relieve hunger. The effect of the disgust emotion on liberals, while small, was in the reverse direction of the effect it had on conservatives. Taken together, the results show that, while disgust alone had a significant effect among the emotional conditions, that effect was wholly contingent on subjects' political ideology.

Turning next to the “refugee” scenario and five associated questions, I begin again with a table showing the effects of the emotional conditions on the first variable, which asked whether refugee admission should be increased or decreased on a 7-point scale. Higher numbers (5-7) indicate support for an increase in the number of refugees admitted to the US, while lower numbers support a decrease (1-3). Table 2 displays the results for this regression without controls (Model 1), with controls but without ideology (Model 2), and with controls and ideology (Model 3).

**Table 2:** Increase/decrease refugee admittance?

VARIABLES	(Model 4)	(Model 5)	(Model 6)
	Rfug Fund	Rfug Fund	Rfug Fund
Control/ Constant	4.570*** (0.105)	4.374*** (0.262)	6.051*** (0.254)
Anger	0.373** (0.151)	0.328** (0.151)	0.350** (0.137)
Disgust	0.166 (0.152)	0.193 (0.151)	0.157 (0.137)
Sadness	0.172 (0.152)	0.146 (0.152)	0.233* (0.137)
Happiness	-0.0582 (0.149)	-0.0426 (0.148)	-0.0225 (0.133)
Age		-0.124*** (0.0378)	-0.0647* (0.0344)
Income		-0.0670*** (0.0222)	-0.0103 (0.0202)
Education		0.186*** (0.0402)	0.116*** (0.0363)
Women		0.402*** (0.0975)	0.312*** (0.0881)
Pol. Knowledge		-0.179 (0.140)	-0.278** (0.127)
Race (white)		-0.0850 (0.114)	0.0465 (0.104)
Ideology			-0.547*** (0.0299)
Observations	1,240	1,206	1,161
R-squared	0.008	0.049	0.263

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

First, notice that the effect of disgust has disappeared. Instead, anger is principally driving changes in subjects' reported level of support for the admittance of refugees. In all three of the models in Table 2, anger has a significant and positive effect on the dependent variable. Positive coefficients indicate an increase in support for increasing the number of admitted refugees with respect to the control condition. In Models 4 and 5, only subjects in the anger-induction condition reported significant differences in their responses when

compared to those in the control group, and anger led subjects to support admitting more refugees to the United States.

Notice, however, that when controlling for ideology in Model 6, the intercept or control condition mean response increased from about 4.5 (Models 4 and 5), to 6.05. Remember, again, that this indicates greater support for adding refugees to the US. Furthermore, for the first time in any of the models, we see that sadness is weakly significant ( $p=0.091$ ) and is moving subjects to be more supportive of refugee admission. The role of ideology in moderating the effects of emotion on the dependent variable is clearly substantial. More on this in Chapter 3.

Results for the remaining 4 variables under the “refugee” scenario yielded similar results, with anger having a significant positive impact on the willingness to support the rights of refugees and actions to protect them. Did any of the emotional categories have a broad impact on subjects’ responses to the 10 questions following the hunger and refugee scenarios? To briefly investigate this possibility, I create scale variables combining: 1) all 5 of the hunger questions, 2) all five of the refugee questions, and 3) all 10 of the questions. When the variables are combined into a single scale variable, it shows more generally how the emotional conditions affected subjects’ attitudes and intended behaviors regarding the right to protection against hunger and the right to asylum. The Cronbach’s Alpha score of the 10 variables was 0.93, 0.91 for the refugee scale, and 0.84 for the hunger scale, indicating an acceptable degree of reliability for each of the three scales. The questions all used a 7-point Likert-style response option, so standardization is not necessary. Each variable ranges from 1-7. Table 3 reports results for the scale using the 5 hunger questions (Model 7), for the refugee questions (Model 8), and for all 10 of the questions (Model 9).

<b>Table 3: OLS- Scale Measures</b>			
VARIABLES	(Model 7) Hunger	(Model 8) Refugee	(Model 9) All
Control/ Constant	6.414*** (0.170)	6.632*** (0.197)	6.524*** (0.168)
Anger	0.0685 (0.110)	0.299** (0.128)	0.183* (0.108)
Disgust	-0.0823 (0.110)	0.125 (0.127)	0.0216 (0.108)
Sadness	-0.00161 (0.110)	0.223* (0.128)	0.111 (0.109)
Happiness	-0.0399 (0.107)	0.0631 (0.124)	0.0118 (0.105)
Age	-0.0745*** (0.0274)	-0.102*** (0.0318)	-0.0881*** (0.0270)
Income	-0.0144 (0.0155)	-0.00445 (0.0180)	-0.00939 (0.0153)
Women	0.262*** (0.0704)	0.332*** (0.0817)	0.297*** (0.0694)
Pol. Knowledge	-0.163 (0.102)	-0.234** (0.118)	-0.199** (0.100)
Race (White)	-0.127 (0.0831)	-0.167* (0.0965)	-0.147* (0.0819)
Ideology	-0.312*** (0.0239)	-0.547*** (0.0277)	-0.430*** (0.0235)
Observations	1,161	1,161	1,161
R-squared	0.166	0.293	0.267

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Overall, Table 3 shows that political ideology had a consistently large and significant negative effect on the relationship between the emotional conditions and the dependent variables. It also shows that gender had a comparable effect, but in the reverse direction. Increasing age had a consistently significant effect, but the effect itself was very small. Anger stands out as the emotional condition with a consistent significant effect in Models 8 and 9, though its lack of an effect in Model 7 indicates that, indeed, it only influenced responses to the questions about refugees. Further analysis in Chapter 3's discussion of ideology will

reveal additional details about these data and what they tell us about how ideological differences and incidental emotion affect our responses to human rights information.

## 5. Discussion and Conclusion

A goal of this dissertation is to understand how the fast, automatic associations of System 1 thinking affect the way we process human rights information. In this chapter, I investigated the ways in which the incidental emotions of anger, disgust, sadness, and happiness affect individuals' views on global hunger and the international refugee crisis. I hypothesized that disgust would lead to increased support for child hunger victims and that anger would lead to decreased support for refugee rights. Ultimately, the effects of disgust on attitudes regarding child hunger were contingent on subjects' political ideology, though no other emotion had a significant effect on subjects' attitudes regarding child hunger. In this sense, the hypothesis was partially supported: disgust stood alone as the emotion with an effect on hunger attitudes. However, the hypothesis misdiagnosed the direction of the effect. Subjects induced to feel disgust were, in fact, less likely to support increasing aid allocations to hungry children.

What explains this finding? My argument in section 2 was that, given that disgust motivates a “discard” response, subjects would be drawn to philanthropic and rights-respecting options as the most tenable ways to rid the mind of whatever disturbance child hunger had caused. Discarding the rights and needs of the hungry, I expected, would be too incongruous with System 2 beliefs. That said, the more punitive, less humanitarian response of those in the disgust condition is not without precedence in the literature. Some studies have shown that those more sensitive to disgust, those with a strong response to disgusting stimuli, are more “severe” in their moral beliefs and judgements (Chapman & Anderson, 2014; Jones & Fitness, 2008). This is known as “disgust amplification,” or the idea that, for

disgust-sensitive individuals, the incidental experience of disgust amplifies the severity of their moral judgements. This is one possible explanation for the supported cuts in hunger relief among subjects induced to feel disgust. Interestingly, Fienberg & Willer (2013) found that, when framing things like environmental degradation in terms of “purity”—the opposite of disgust—political conservatives tended to become much more supportive of pro-environmental policies. Given that, in Chapter 3, I show that the disgust effect in these data was almost entirely driven by conservatives, this suggests a possibility for future research. If hunger relief could make starving children clean and neat, might we see the reverse of the effect observed in this study?

In my second hypothesis, I argued that individuals in the anger condition would support more punitive actions towards refugees. While, again, the hypothesis was partially supported as anger had the largest and most consistently significant effect among all of the other emotions, the direction was the reverse of what I expected. Why would angry subjects be more willing to allow refugees into the US, spend more money helping them, and support refugee rights more broadly? The answer, I suspect, becomes clearer in Chapter 3’s discussion of ideology. Briefly, it was political liberals in the anger condition who displayed views significantly different from the control condition. Conservatives had no such reaction. I suspect that the experience of anger, while reading about refugee statistics, caused liberals to support punitive policies against the *current* administration. Nonetheless, that suspicion is only conjecture at this stage, and future work is necessary to uncover the motivations behind the seemingly humanitarian impulses of angry liberals.

Ultimately, this experiment showed that incidental emotions do have a significant impact on support for human rights, but that these effects are not universal. Instead,

emotion's influence was deeply tied to political ideology. For HROs looking for ways to deploy emotional appeals in order to attract new advocates to the cause, being aware of and sensitive to the intended audience is a key consideration. Furthermore, in leveraging emotion, HROs would be wise to focus on the negative—only disgust, anger, and to a lesser degree, sadness had effects on human rights attitudes. In the cases of anger and sadness, those effects were positive. Chapter 2 explores the role of negativity in human rights messaging more closely.

## CHAPTER 2: Human rights imagery, efficacy, and prospect theory

### 1. Introduction

Chapter 1 focused on the specific role of implicit emotions in the formation of attitudes regarding human rights, or how certain emotional dispositions can lead to different, “automatic” reactions to issues commonly raised by human rights campaigns. Among the findings was that negative emotions, broadly speaking, led to greater support for rights than other emotions. Campaigns that fail to arouse negative emotions, on balance, are not likely to be as successful in attracting support as those that do. HRO approaches to campaign messaging can be tailored and improved when there is a clear expectation that engendering certain emotions increases their effectiveness. Nonetheless, HROs are unlikely to ask subjects to “describe a situation that made them feel disgusted” before asking for a donation or commitment to join a protest. In this chapter, I focus less on how System 1 features might affect HR attitudes in the abstract, but instead turn to those features which might affect the impact of concrete human rights messages on individuals.

Among the System 1 features that have been found to have a significant influence on political attitudes are the so-called “negativity bias,” and the effects that gain/loss framing have on political choices. The negativity bias, originally discovered in psychology research, finds that stimuli with a negative valence are significantly more likely to draw and hold our attention than positive or neutrally valenced stimuli. Within political science, this phenomenon has been used to explain phenomena as diverse as news consumption habits and the content of political speeches (Sobieraj and Berry 2011; Mutz and Reeves 2005), to the emphasis on external threats by political conservatives (Hibbing, Smith, and Alford 2014). Similarly, the phenomenon of loss-aversion emerged from prospect theory researchers in behavioral economics, but has since been widely applied in political science



(Levy 1996; Boettcher 2004; Jervis 1992; Stein 2017). Loss-aversion finds that individuals are more likely to choose the same outcome when it is framed as a potential loss versus a potential gain. According to this strand of research, people much prefer to avoid losing \$100 than they prefer to gain \$100.

Each of these cognitive biases are uniquely supported by a wide and interdisciplinary body of research, but have yet to be considered within the realm of human rights messaging. Below, I discuss how the negativity bias has been used to promote things like environmental protection and public health, but that its effectiveness in motivating change is tied to the use of messaging emphasizing the possibility of efficacious action. I turn to prospect theory and loss-aversion as a potentially fruitful source of efficacious messages, and ultimately argue that the combination of negative imagery with messages emphasizing the avoidance of losses is a powerful way to construct human rights information.

To test my argument, I conducted a survey experiment on a nationally-representative sample of US participants, finding strong support for the effectiveness of negative imagery in motivating changes in intended behaviors and beliefs in support of a human rights issue. I find less support for the effectiveness of a loss message in motivating the same changes, but instead find strong support for a message emphasizing potential gains.

## 2. Overview and Hypotheses

### 2.1. The Negativity Bias

A central finding of the literature on political information and imagery is the so-called “negativity bias,” which a leading psychology textbook describes as “...an outcome where negative information contributes more to the formation or change of an opinion than does positive information” (Allen and Burrell 2002, p. 83). Leading theories in evolutionary psychology argue that our bias for negative information stems from the rather

straightforward observation that individuals who were highly-attuned to dangers and threats in their environment were more likely to survive and produce offspring than those that were not. Over time, our species shows a distinct attentional preference for negative stimuli in our environment.

While this bias was initially targeted, presumably, at things like Sabre-toothed tigers, today it directs our attention towards the negative in the hyper-stimulating multimedia environment where multiple product advertisers, technological devices, and political organizations compete for influence over our behavior and decisions. Psychophysiological research has found that, compared to positively-valenced or neutral images, we are drawn to more negative images, we look there longer, and our bodies even have greater physiological arousal in response to them (Mather, et. al. 2004; Ito, et. al. 1998; Peters, et. al. 2013, Hibbing, et. al. 2014a). The negativity bias may explain why conflictual, “uncivil” political talk shows like “The O’Reilly Factor” get huge ratings, while more traditional news programs on PBS get much lower ratings (Mutz and Reeves 2005). The psychological bias for negativity has led political parties, PACs, the television news media, and other US political actors to embrace negativity as a way to garner attention, get ratings, or even attract people to the cause (Sobieraj and Berry 2011; Mutz and Reeves 2005).

Negativity is further advantaged by its ability to attract and hold attention even in complex, multi-tasking and multi-media environments (Cooper 2013). Absent a face-to-face interaction (and sometimes, lamentably, even that isn’t enough), individuals encountering campaign information from HROs are likely to be engaged in a variety of other tasks—checking emails at work and clicking on a message from Amnesty International or the World Food Programme, driving in the city and seeing a public mural or billboard from a local

church or community organization focused on a rights issue, browsing the internet and seeing banners, etc. Cooper (2013) finds not only that negatively-valenced stimuli attract attention in multitasking environments, but also that individuals are more likely to complete tasks associated with negative (vs. positive or neutral) information when distracted and multitasking.

Taken together, multiple strands of research on the negativity bias give HR advocates reason to recommend that HRO's include all sorts of images, films, and personal testimonials which focus on the negative--on the abuse and suffering of the victims of human rights abuse--in their attempts to attract supporters to the cause. Negative stimuli lead to more arousal, and better performance on completing a required task when simultaneously multi-tasking. Human rights campaigns directed at engaging potential advocates and engendering an action such as donating, signing a petition, agreeing to join a protest, or simply changing one's views (all discrete "tasks") are likely to be encountered by subjects who are multi-tasking. Coming across a banner advertisement or directed email from an HRO is almost certain to occur within a multi-media, multi-tasking environment where smartphone activities, social media, and other online tasks are occurring concordant with the encounter of the human rights message. Given this media environment, we should expect negatively-valenced HR stimuli to garner greater attention and greater "performance" in completing the associated "task."

**H1:** Negatively-valenced imagery will, *ceteris paribus*, have a larger positive effect on advocacy and intended behaviors regarding a human rights issue than positive- or neutrally- valenced imagery.

## 2.2. Negativity, Disengagement, and Efficacy

However, the effects of our preference for the negative on attitudinal and behavioral change is less well understood. While people seem to “prefer” negative imagery, its effects can lead to apathy or cynicism. For example, cigarette packs that display only images of diseased lungs or mouth cancer have not been associated with any increased avoidance of smoking (Hansen and Topolinski 2010). Similarly, while individuals prefer political advertisements and television shows with high negativity, these types of media lead to lower levels of overall trust for politicians, and consumers of negative and conflictual media are more likely to lose faith in the political process as a whole (Mutz and Reeves 2005; Guggenheim, et. al. 2010; Avery 2009; Forgette and Morris 2006). That is, while individuals are drawn to negative representations, such representations may lead to decreased feelings of political efficacy. This begs the question—given the plethora of bad news regarding human rights--do negative human rights messages lead to disengagement?

A recent meta-analysis (Peters, et. al. 2013) of health-related warning materials provides, I think, an interesting parallel to human rights imagery. In places like Canada, Australia, Brazil, and many other countries, cigarette packs are required to include large, graphic warning labels, often depicting disease, the suffering of children and infants, and even death (similar, legally-required labels in the US were overturned by the Supreme Court in 2013). These images depict actual harm and evoke notions of fear and threat. Images of certain types of human rights abuse, such as torture, starvation, or genocide, seem likely to fit within a similar category. Indeed, I proposed studying just these types of messages in the two previous studies I outline above. But despite the prevalence of these anti-tobacco messages and cross-national evidence that they get smokers’ attention, there is little evidence

that such images alone lead to quitting behavior on the part of non-smokers (Peters, et. al. 2013; Ruiter and Kok 2005).

Instead, Peters, et. al. (2013) find that the effect of negative imagery on behavior is greatest when there is a corresponding message of “self-efficacy.” They define efficacy as “...one's ability to negate the harm, a function of the effectiveness of a potential response in negating the harm (response efficacy) and one's capability to enact that response (self-efficacy).” Without accompanying beliefs of efficacy, the authors argue that negative imagery quite literally backfires. It causes disengagement, dismissal of the severity of the problem, and apathy. This finding has been supported in other areas of social science as well, including in areas that are much closer to politics. For example, Feldman, et al. (2015) and Hart and Feldman (2014), argue that messages of efficacy play an important role in the area of climate change and environmental protection. They cite a body of research which shows that “...messages about risk issues such as climate change may draw attention to the issue if strong threat information is provided but that it is critical for threat information to be accompanied by information about the efficacy of actions that individuals can take to help address the issue” (2014, pp. 326). This leads to my central hypothesis for this research project: Positive human rights messages, such as the depiction of thriving children, will not have as strong of an effect on the attention of individuals when compared to negative messages, such as the depiction of starving children. However, because negative messages may be associated with disengagement, strong commitments for action on behalf of human rights will require a clear and unambiguous demonstration of efficacious action available to the individual. In short, I argue that an efficacious message combined with a negative image will drive individual opinion towards both strong support for human rights and positive action on behalf of human rights.

### 2.3. Framing Efficacy: Prospect Theory and Loss Aversion

Peters, et al. (2013); Feldman, et al. (2015); Hart and Feldman (2014), and others studying the relationships between negative information, efficacy, and outcomes, generally describe an efficacious response as one that “negates harm.” If a message about disease and death caused by smoking or climate change is combined with realistic instructions on what the individual can do about it, the message is more likely to succeed in changing beliefs and behavior. Much of this literature, however, leaves out the large body of research in the behavioral sciences focused on identifying the ways in which variations in the framing of efficacious messages produces different behavioral outcomes.

Chief among the theories of framing and behavior is Prospect Theory (PT) first developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and since supported by a wide and diverse body of research in political science (Vis 2011; Levy 1997; 2003; Druckman 2004), and particularly in the field of international relations (McDermott 2004; Mercer 2005; Hafner-Burton, et. al. 2017 for review). Prospect theory maintains that individuals make different decisions when the same choice is framed as a gain versus a loss. An environment-related message might, for example, emphasize that individuals could enjoy the benefits of a cleaner environment by changing certain behaviors (approach-gains scenario), or that they could avoid the damages of a dirtier environment by changing the same behaviors (avoid-losses scenario). In the prospect theory literature—while some meta-analyses have found mixed results (O’Keefe and Jensen 2007; 2009)—the general consensus is that individuals strongly prefer the avoidance of losses over the indulgence of gains (Kahneman & Tversky 1992; Barkley-Levenson, Leijenhorst, & Galván 2013; Yechiam 2013).

Loss-aversion, like the effect of incidental emotions discussed in Chapter 1, and like the negativity bias discussed here, is an automatic, System 1 response to external stimuli. It

has been associated with activation of the autonomic nervous system (Hochman & Yechiam 2011), and it has been demonstrated in non-human animals (Silberberg 2008). Furthermore, like the other System 1 modes of cognition discussed in this dissertation, it has been found to exert a significant influence on attention (Yechiam & Hochman 2013). Scenarios and/or choices framed in terms of losses have been found to attract significantly more attention than similar scenarios that emphasize gains.

Above, I argue that negative imagery combined with messages emphasizing efficacious action is likely to be a powerful approach for attracting support for HR causes. Efficacious messages, however, can be framed in terms of potential losses or potential gains. A developed and substantial body of literature finds that individuals are both more attentive to losses than gains, and more likely to choose to avoid losses rather than achieve gains. For these two reasons, I argue that negative imagery combined with an efficacious message emphasizing the avoidance of losses is a uniquely effective way to attract advocates to HR causes within our complex, multitasking world of information.

**H2:** Negative imagery combined with a message emphasizing the avoidance of losses will have a larger effect on advocacy and intended behaviors regarding a human rights issue than negative imagery combined with a message emphasizing the enjoyment of gains, and positive imagery emphasizing either gains or losses.

### 3. Research Design

To evaluate the hypotheses described above, I designed and executed a survey experiment using the Qualtrics Omnibus (qBus) survey. The qBus survey provides researchers with a sample of about 1,000 participants, where key demographic variables such as age, income, gender, education, and political party identification are commensurate with

US national averages. The qBus allows researchers to purchase questions on the larger survey to obtain a sample that is representative of the US population. In addition to the benefits of obtaining a representative sample, qBus participants complete the survey online using either a computer or mobile device—mimicking more closely the type of conditions under which an individual might encounter HRO messages in the real world.

The experiment compares the effects of positive imagery, negative imagery, approach-gain messages, and avoid-loss messages, with the goal being to identify which combination yields the greatest probability that subjects are willing report beliefs and intended behaviors in support of a poverty-related human rights claim. The image (positive/negative) and the associated message (gain/loss) are the independent variables. The approach-gain message conveys how taking action to provide relief to hungry children yields gains, whereas the avoid-loss message conveys how taking action to provide relief avoids losses. The images and associated messages are provided in Figure 1 below. I chose child hunger as the specific human rights issue to consider because 1) it is an issue of urgent human rights concern; 2) emotional responses to images of children are strong (Brosch, et. al. 2007; Leibenluft, et. al. 2004), making this a more difficult test of the hypotheses; and 3) there exist straightforward ways to address child hunger, making the gain/loss frames both familiar and believable. In addition to a control group (Group 5), the experiment contains four treatment groups outlined in the 2x2

**Table 1: Treatment Groups**

		Message Type	
		Approach-Gain	Avoid-Loss
Image Valence	Positive	<i>Group 1</i>	<i>Group 2</i>
	Negative	<i>Group 3</i>	<i>Group 4</i>



In keeping with other studies comparing the use of certain image/narrative combinations on political attitudes, subjects in the Control group view an image of neckties with an associated message about the history of neckties (McEntire, Leiby, and Krain 2015). This provides a purely neutral stimuli from which to measure subjects' baseline attitudes on the human rights in question. The "positive image" depicts smiling, seemingly healthy children, whereas the "negative image" depicts children clearly malnourished, suffering from extreme hunger. To maintain the internal validity of the experiment, the number of children, their skin tone, and distance from the camera is roughly equivalent in each picture.

Figure 1: Experimental Stimuli

Positive Image, Approach-Gain Message



Each of us has the power to take action to give food to hungry children, even when governments don't help. Taking action is as easy as making a small donation, signing a petition, or helping to fundraise in your own community. Doing any one of these things will make you happier, make your life feel more meaningful, and could save the life of a child.

Taking steps to feed hungry children benefits both you and them.

Negative Image, Avoid-Loss Message



We can't rely on governments to solve the problem of child hunger, we must take action ourselves. If we fail to contribute to the fight to feed hungry children, we have to deal with the knowledge that our inaction left children hungry. This knowledge makes us less happy, takes away a chance at adding meaning to our lives, and could cost a child their life.

Not taking steps to help feed hungry children hurts both you and them.

There are five survey questions that function as the main dependent variables in this study. Each uses a 7-point Likert-scale to measure subjects willingness to 1) donate their survey compensation, if given the option, to a group providing relief to hungry children; 2) organize a fundraiser in their own community to raise funds for hunger relief; 3) sign a petition calling on the US and the UN to increase hunger relief; 4) support tax increases or program cuts in the US to increase funding for international hunger relief; 5) agree with the belief that all children have a fundamental right to adequate food and shelter.

While subjects are randomly assigned to view only one of the image/message combinations, all groups answer the same subsequent set of survey questions. The order of the dependent variable survey measures was randomized to minimize possible question-order effects. The control variables in this study include standard demographic information such as age, gender, and education, and I also collect information on the respondent's political ideology (liberal/left-conservative/right), and political knowledge—as each of these categories has been found to predict variance in human rights attitudes (Moghaddam and Vuksanovic 1990; McFarland and Mathews 2005, Cohrs. et al. 2007).

#### 4. Results

Survey results reveal that random assignment to each of the 5 experimental groups was successful. The demographic categories of age, gender, income, education, and political ideology were not significantly related with assignment in any of the groups.

Results were similar for the experiment treatments across all five of the dependent variables. First, I will provide a more detailed breakdown of results for the dependent variable which asked subjects whether they would be willing to donate their survey compensation, if given the option, to a group providing poverty and food relief to children.

Next, I'll provide a more general overview of the rest of the dependent variables, as well as a scale variable which combines responses from all five of the IVs.

Several analyses were performed on each of the dependent variables, and all showed roughly the same results. For the “donate” question, using ordered logit, ANOVA/ANOVCA, or simple OLS regression all reveal that the treatment group which combined the negative image with the “approach-gain” message outperformed the rest. Because OLS regression allows for easy interpretation both with and without control variables, results using this method are reported in Tables 2 and 3 below. Table 2, Model 1, displays a restricted regression of our experimental groups against the “donate” variable. Table 2, Model 2, displays the regression with control variables of age, gender (woman), race (white), income, education, political knowledge, and political ideology (conservative). Because race, gender, and political knowledge are categorical, each is made dichotomous for easy inclusion and interpretation in the model. Because the sample was 67% white/Caucasian, the variable capturing race is coded as white vs. nonwhite. For ease of interpretation, and consistency with chapters 1 and 3, political ideology is coded as Conservative vs. non-conservative. The political knowledge question had only one correct answer (“Which party holds the majority of seats in the US Senate”), and is coded as correct vs. incorrect.

**Table 2: OLS Regression**

VARIABLES	Model 1 Donate?	Model 2 Donate?
Control/Constant	4.766*** (0.136)	5.626*** (0.272)
Pos Image, Gain	0.272 (0.191)	0.286 (0.186)
Pos Image, Loss	0.145 (0.190)	0.172 (0.185)
Neg Image, Gain	0.402** (0.191)	0.412** (0.187)
Neg Image, Loss	0.279 (0.193)	0.319* (0.188)
Age		-0.0166*** (0.00388)
Woman		0.226* (0.122)
White		-0.226 (0.146)
Income		0.145*** (0.0514)
Education		-0.0175 (0.0436)
Pol. Knowledge		-0.322** (0.134)
Conservative		-0.487*** (0.120)
Observations	1,039	1,039
R-squared	0.005	0.066

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Looking first at Model 1, we see that the average response for individuals in the control group was 4.77, which approximates to the response “It is somewhat likely that I would donate” on the 7-point scale. Of the treatment groups, only the negative image combined with the approach-gain message led to a mean response that was statistically

different from the control. However, there are good theoretical reasons to suspect that the control variables included in Model 2 will have a significant influence on subjects' response to the experimental treatments.

Turning to Model 2, the average response in the control group was 5.63, holding constant values for age, gender, race, income, education, political knowledge, and political ideology. Interestingly, in Model 2 we see that both of the negative image conditions led to significant differences with respect to the control. For individuals in the negative image, approach-gain condition, the mean response was 6.04, and for those in the negative image, avoid-loss condition it was 5.95. Several of the control variables also had a significant influence on the willingness to donate. As income increased, so did the willingness to donate, and women were more likely than men to report a willingness to donate. Conversely, as age increased, willingness to donate decreased. Those with greater political knowledge and political conservatives were also less likely to donate. Political conservatism had the largest negative effect on the willingness to donate than any other variable in the model. The same was true for the remainder of the models in Table 3—a result that will be explored more closely in Chapter 3. Neither race (White) nor education level had a significant influence on the dependent variable.

Results for the remaining 4 dependent variables revealed a similar pattern. Table 3 displays the findings for these variables using all of the controls included in Table 1, Model 2. Because results are similar, the use of a scale variable which combines all 5 of the DVs is appropriate. The Cronbach's Alpha score of the 5 variables was 0.86, and the resultant scale variable had a mean of 5.30 and standard deviation of 1.31, on a scale of 1-7.

**Table 3: OLS Regression**

VARIABLES	Model 3 Petition?	Model 4 Organize?	Model 5 Tax raise?	Model 6 Child rights?	Model 7 SCALE
Control/Constant	6.635*** (0.222)	6.514*** (0.225)	6.200*** (0.241)	5.967*** (0.159)	6.189*** (0.177)
Pos Image, Gain	0.109 (0.152)	0.170 (0.154)	0.0528 (0.165)	0.0319 (0.109)	0.130 (0.121)
Pos Image, Loss	0.0539 (0.151)	0.181 (0.153)	0.206 (0.164)	0.0832 (0.108)	0.139 (0.121)
Neg Image, Gain	0.309** (0.152)	0.330** (0.155)	0.400** (0.165)	0.295*** (0.109)	0.349*** (0.122)
Neg Image, Loss	0.0439 (0.153)	0.276* (0.155)	0.318* (0.166)	0.00931 (0.110)	0.193 (0.122)
Age	-0.0151*** (0.00316)	-0.0326*** (0.00321)	-0.0225*** (0.00343)	0.000513 (0.00226)	-0.0173*** (0.00252)
Woman	-0.0536 (0.0991)	-0.186* (0.101)	-0.209* (0.107)	0.219*** (0.0709)	-0.000804 (0.0791)
White	-0.0186 (0.119)	-0.0298 (0.121)	-0.0540 (0.129)	0.0883 (0.0851)	-0.0480 (0.0949)
Income	-0.0132 (0.0419)	0.0674 (0.0425)	-0.0398 (0.0454)	0.0376 (0.0300)	0.0394 (0.0334)
Education	0.0195 (0.0355)	0.0189 (0.0360)	0.0809** (0.0385)	-0.00670 (0.0254)	0.0190 (0.0283)
Pol. Knowledge	-0.0981 (0.109)	-0.290*** (0.111)	-0.162 (0.119)	0.0949 (0.0783)	-0.155* (0.0873)
Conservative	-0.888*** (0.0981)	-0.488*** (0.0995)	-1.023*** (0.106)	-0.264*** (0.0702)	-0.630*** (0.0782)
Observations	1,039	1,039	1,039	1,039	1,039
R-squared	0.113	0.147	0.152	0.040	0.129

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Taken together, the results provide strong support for H1, that negative imagery would lead to attitudes more supportive of a human rights issue than positive imagery. The negative image, loss condition led to increased support for donating, organizing fundraisers, raising taxes, and was weakly significant on the Scale variable ( $p=0.11$ ). The negative image, gain condition was statistically significant at  $p<0.5$  or better on all 5 of the DVs and the scale

variable. By contrast, neither of the positive image conditions had a significant effect on the any of the DVs.

Drawing on the loss aversion literature, H2 predicted that, among the negative image conditions, the message emphasizing the avoidance of losses would outperform the message emphasizing potential gains. This hypothesis was not supported. Instead, the results showed the opposite. It was in fact the negative image, approach-gain message treatment that performed remarkably well across all 5 of the DVs, and the scale variable. Even in those models where the negative image, avoid-loss condition had a significant influence, the magnitude of the gain message difference was larger.

## 5. Discussion and Conclusion

Human rights organizations rely on effective communication to attract active supporters. Nearly all of the activities carried out by HROs require some level of financial or other support in order to carry out activities designed to motivate human rights changes. In this chapter, I considered two well-established, reflexive aspects of human psychology—the negativity bias and the loss aversion bias—known to affect both what captures our attention and what influences the choices we make. I argued that negative images combined with messages emphasizing the avoidance of losses would be an effective approach for attracting human rights advocates.

Taken together, one part of my argument received strong support. When compared to the control group, subjects who viewed an image of starving children were significantly more likely to report a willingness to take actions to help improve the children’s plight, and were more likely to agree that children had a fundamental right to food and shelter, than those that viewed an image of smiling, happy children. This is consistent with the literature



on the negativity bias, which finds that individuals are more drawn to the negative, more psychologically and physiologically aroused by the negative, and more able to complete discreet tasks when the associated stimuli is negative. The findings in this project provide yet another level of support for this phenomenon. The same psychological bias that draws people to watch cable news programs where hosts and guests argue in raised voices about the dangers of foreigners, can also draw people to support expanded assistance for hungry, “foreign” children.

The second aspect of my argument, that messages emphasizing losses would be more effective than those emphasizing gains, was not supported. Instead, it was the approach-gains message—combined with the negative image—that consistently outperformed all other treatment groups. What explains this unexpected result?

While the evidence for loss-aversion is substantial, the findings in this project are not without precedent in the literature. An emerging literature finds that loss-aversion may be magnitude dependent. That is, when the magnitude of losses/gains is small—either in absolute terms or relative to a reference magnitude—loss aversion may disappear, or even reverse (Harinck, et al. 2007; Mukherjee, et al. 2017). When the potential gains/losses are very small, Harinck, et al. (2007) found in a series of experiments that individuals may find an approach-gains framing more attractive than an avoid-loss one. While it may offend the moral sentiments of those hoping for an other-centered ethos, one could argue that the perceived gains/losses in this particular experiment are very small. While declining to take actions to help children facing hunger in the developing world may make a tremendous difference for a child, the loss I describe in the prompt of “having to deal with the knowledge that our inaction left children hungry,” making us “less happy” and “taking away

a chance to add meaning to our lives” may seem small. While losing these things might not bother individuals, perhaps the chance to gain them gives us more motivation.

Another possibility is that the negative image already did all of the “work” that an avoid-loss message would do in the sample. Loss aversion has sometimes been described as “loss attention,” with the argument being that loss framing doesn’t affect the way we weigh choices, per se, but rather it only draws our attention and focus more effectively than gain framing (Yechiam 2013; Hochman & Yechiam 2011). Thus, the low stakes combined with the attentional draw of the negative image, may mute or otherwise “wash out” the effect of loss aversion.

Ultimately, the effects of loss aversion and prospect theory more generally deserve greater investigation within the context of human rights messaging. Similarly, while these results provide strong support for the utility of the negativity bias in crafting human rights messages, further research should consider other human rights issue areas. Does an image of a polluted lake lead to greater engagement than a pristine one with regards to environmental rights? What about those human rights issues where directly-relevant negative imagery may be hard to capture—such as the rights of workers to a fair wage, the right to free expression, or of due process? Comparing positive and negative written narratives, for example, may be more appropriate in those cases. Does leveraging the negativity bias lead only to one-off donations or other immediate activities, or can it improve the chances of engaging a long-term type of advocacy? These questions, among others, suggest a fruitful avenue for future research of immediate practical utility.

## CHAPTER 3: How Ideological Predispositions Affect Human Rights Attitudes

### 1. Introduction

In this chapter, I consider how one crucial aspect of our political psychology—political ideology—helps to explain the ways in which individuals process, understand, and ultimately form policy views on human rights. In the United States, political ideology tends to correlate strongly with partisanship, where those leaning left associate with Democrats and those on the right associate with Republicans. Despite the prominence of ideology and partisanship in research concerning behavior and psychology within American politics, no studies of human rights have explicitly considered how the left-right divide affects the efforts of HROs to attract supporters. Does an individual’s political ideology affect how they respond to information about human rights abuses? Are there systematic ways in which different types of information about human rights are interpreted and acted upon by liberals and conservatives?

To begin to answer these questions, I bring together findings from Chapters 1 and 2 and re-evaluate them through the lens of political ideology. In light of the findings I present below, I argue that while conservatives are considerably less likely than liberals to support certain human rights, their views may be more likely to change when abuses are portrayed using “negative” imagery, and when such imagery is combined with messages clearly elucidating benefits to both the victim and the benefactor. Importantly, however, not all negative information and/or imagery is created equal—conservatives appear less likely to adopt pro-human rights attitudes when the stimulus produces a disgust reaction. The negativity bias, it seems, has less of an effect on liberal attitudes regarding human rights than it does on conservatives, but liberals primed to experience anger or sadness displayed greater levels of support for rights issues. I show how these ideological differences in individuals are

manifested in important policy questions regarding the human rights of malnourished and hungry children and the rights of refugees.

### 1.1. Political Ideology and International Human Rights

There is ample evidence that we should expect ideology to be central to human rights attitudes. Like emotion, political ideology has well-established cognitive and behavioral consequences that affect political attitudes in systematic ways. A growing and increasingly sophisticated literature now finds that ideological affinity with the “right” or “left” end of the political spectrum is deeply embedded in the physiology, neurobiology, and possibly even the genes of individuals (Hibbing, Smith, and Alford 2014b). For example, substantial evidence now exists that liberals and conservatives process visual information differently, have different physiological reactions to political and even non-political stimuli, and subconsciously view the world in fundamentally different ways (Jost, et. al. 2013; Krosch, et. al. 2013; Jost and Amodio 2012; Oxley, et. al. 2008; Alford, Funk, and Hibbing 2005; Hibbing, Smith, & Alford 2014b). Among the findings of this research is that conservatives are more cognizant of and disturbed by perceived threats, less trusting of outsiders, and more disturbed by violations of established order.

These ideological differences also manifest themselves in how liberals and conservatives respond to information and imagery. For example, Hibbing, Smith, & Alford (2014b) presented subjects with an array of images depicting positive (e.g. sunny beach) and negative (e.g. burning house) phenomena. Using eye-tracking software, they found that conservatives were more likely to attend to negative images, and vice versa for liberals. Conservatives were also more likely to describe “neutral” facial expressions as angry or upset, and exhibited significantly greater physiological arousal when exposed to disgusting or threatening stimuli.

These “deep-seated,” System 1 differences in the processing of sensory experiences by liberals and conservatives have also been shown to have clear implications for more explicit real-world policy. Among the key findings of framing research in political psychology is that liberals and conservatives respond to the framing of political information in systematically different ways. For example, in a wide-ranging and thorough study of how ideology interacted with views on the environment, Feinberg and Willer (2013) found that the moral framing of environmental threats was interpreted in different ways by liberals and conservatives. They found, *inter alia*, that liberals were more convinced by environmental arguments based on harm and care, whereas conservatives were more convinced by arguments about environmental “purity,” the moral inverse of disgust. That is, environmental threats that evoked feelings of danger/threat, disgust, and/or disease were found to be highly convincing to conservatives. Thus, there are good theoretical reasons to suspect that liberals and conservatives may respond quite differently to human rights information, may support very different responses to human rights abuses, and may conceptualize human rights in very different ways.

This chapter therefore seeks to identify the ways in which political ideology may capture variations in the effects on human rights attitudes of incidental emotions, the negativity bias, and loss aversion among individuals. Making this distinction is important because, while previous research has indicated that self-reported support for human rights is widespread among both liberals and conservatives (for example, a 2014 Amnesty International Report surveyed over 21,000 people in 21 countries, finding that fully 82% supported laws against torture), beliefs about how (and if) human rights abuses should be confronted may differ. Identifying the ways in which ideology explains variation in System 1 reactions to human rights messages sheds light on the origins of those differences.

## 2. Theory and Description of Studies

The theoretical justification for this approach draws on the aforementioned work of Keck and Sikkink (1998) and Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink (1999). These authors develop a theory of the impact of HROs on human rights outcomes through “transnational advocacy networks.” TANs work by connecting HROs with domestic audiences to form a network that puts pressure on states to improve their human rights practices. This places pressure on the state from “above” (through transnational HROs) and from “below” (through domestic movements). As Murdie and Davis (2012) describe, “key to improvements in human rights performance is the combination of both domestic pressure and involvement by HROs and shaming on the international stage.” A key piece of this model is the relationship between NGOs and domestic audiences. The success of an NGO in garnering a sufficient level of domestic pressure is, at least in part, contingent on its ability to attract supporters to the cause, both supporters from outside the target state—to provide funds, legal representation, etc.—and within the target state.

As I discuss in the introductory chapter, attracting supporters often means providing information on human rights abuses and the norms that they violate (Murdie and Davis 2012; Welch 2001). This information is *purposeful*, designed to create committed supporters (both in and outside of the target state) who will take action by developing and advocating for policy goals that respect human rights. However, the key contention of this chapter is that we should expect responses to this information to be contingent, likely to a large degree, on the political ideologies of those receiving it. This contingency has at least two core components. First, we should expect liberals and conservatives to begin with baseline differences in their beliefs and attitudes about human rights issues. Such a finding shouldn't be surprising or controversial—for decades the left has been associated with support for

economic rights like the right to healthcare or fair wages, whereas the right has tended to prioritize civil rights like the right to property or equality under the law. However, these baseline differences remain largely unexplored or ignored in the literature relating domestic audiences to the outcome of human rights campaigns. Second, as a consequence of the psychological predispositions discussed above, we should expect liberals and conservatives to *respond differently* to the same type of information about human rights abuses. Below, I provide evidence that, when compared to conservatives, liberals' experience of incidental disgust and anger led to increases in their levels of support for refugee rights, whereas conservatives' experience of incidental disgust led to decreases in support for the rights of hungry children. However, conservatives expressed statistical and substantive increases in their support for the rights of hungry children when presented with negative imagery and an associated message emphasizing gains, whereas liberals did not. For the purposes of this chapter, I focus on select rights-related policy questions on which liberals and conservatives were found to have significant differences, both in baseline attitudes and in their responses to experimental stimuli.

### 3. Liberals and Conservatives: Baseline Differences


As I discussed above, some existing studies have examined the ways in which certain characteristics of individuals, such as right-wing-authoritarianism, affect support for human rights. Sam McFarland, for example, has written extensively on the belief systems characteristic of those who tend to be supportive of human rights, and of those that are not. For example, he and Melissa Mathews find that those most likely to prioritize human rights are "..., high in principled moral reasoning, empathetic, and optimistic" whereas less supportive individuals are more likely to have the characteristics of "ethnocentrism and its root dispositions of social dominance and authoritarianism" (2005, p. 1).

I suspect that McFarland and Matthews’s findings overlap considerably with the differences in political ideology. Indeed, what they describe as “supporters of human rights” versus those that are “less supportive,” correspond with the baseline differences in Chapters 1 and 2 between liberals and conservatives. Table 1 below displays differences in mean control group responses in Chapter 1 by political ideology on the 10 dependent variables.



**Table 1: Baseline Differences: Emotions Study**

Note: Higher numbers indicate agreement



As expected, and perhaps unsurprisingly, Table 1 reveals wide differences in the baseline attitudes of liberals and conservatives on the issues of global hunger relief for children and the resettlement of refugees in the US. Given that (anti-)refugee issues were a priority for the Republican Trump administration during the 2016 campaign, and have continued to be a contentious topic in US politics through 2017 and 2018, we should be less surprised to see the large differences in Q6-Q7. While conservatives were much more likely to agree that refugees had a right to seek asylum than they were to agree with any plans to grant that asylum in the US, liberals still averaged much higher on that question.

Similarly, while global child hunger is a much less contentious issue in American politics, liberals and conservatives still expressed considerable disagreement on Q1-Q5. The response to questions Q1 (increase funding for child hunger relief) and Q3 (raise funds through family and friends, or organize a fundraiser in your own community for child hunger relief), are particularly surprising, especially given the controversial but well-publicized finding that conservatives give more of their money away to charity.<sup>5</sup>


Given that the study in Chapter 1 was gathered from Mturk, where conservatives are underrepresented, younger, and less wealthy than conservatives in the broader US, perhaps the questions about child hunger in Chapter 2 would provide a different, more accurate picture? Recall that Chapter 2 utilized a sample that is more representative of the US population, and the average American conservative, than the Mturk sample. Nonetheless, Table 2 shows that similar divergence in baseline views on global child hunger occurred between liberals and conservatives in the Qualtrics sample, but that conservative views were slightly more moderate.

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<sup>5</sup> <http://articles.latimes.com/2014/mar/31/business/la-fi-mh-conservatives-or-liberals-20140331>

**Table 2: Baseline Differences: Bias Study**

Note: Higher numbers indicate agreement



#### 4. Attitudinal Change: Left and Right

Again, while the ideological differences on the questions about global child hunger would undoubtedly be surprising to some, the broader observation that liberals and conservatives have wide differences in their baseline views on human rights would be much less surprising. However, the purpose of the studies conducted in chapters 1 and 2, and the broader dissertation as a whole, is to investigate how human rights attitudes and behaviors change in response to information about human rights. More specifically, I hope to provide a nuanced understanding of the ways in which System 1 thinking, the type that is automatic, quick, and outside of our conscious control, affects the ways in which we process human rights information. Does the limbic portion of the brain respond differently to messages about child hunger or refugee rights depending on a person's political ideology? For the reasons outlined in section 2 of this chapter, there are good reasons to expect that there will be. To begin, I turn back to the emotions experiment carried out in Chapter 1.

Recall that, in Chapter 1, there was a positive statistical relationship between those in the disgust condition and decreased support for child hunger relief. However, this relationship disappeared when ideology was added as a control variable to the model. In Table 3, I report the results of separate regressions for liberals and conservatives in the sample.

**Table 3:** OLS- Increase funding for child hunger relief?

VARIABLES	(Model 1)	(Model 2)
	Liberal	Conservative
Control/Constant	4.916*** (0.216)	5.016*** (0.314)
Anger	0.0704 (0.148)	0.121 (0.219)
Disgust	0.0669 (0.145)	-0.501** (0.223)
Sadness	0.0718 (0.149)	0.138 (0.218)
Happiness	0.0472 (0.142)	-0.110 (0.215)
Age	0.00945 (0.0367)	-0.00159 (0.0548)
Income	-0.0192 (0.0213)	-0.00776 (0.0301)
Women	0.0280 (0.0947)	0.169 (0.141)
Pol. Knowledge	0.168 (0.141)	-0.446** (0.199)
Race (White)	0.0816 (0.105)	-0.411** (0.183)
Observations	686	475
R-squared	0.005	0.055

Standard errors in parentheses  
\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

The results of the separate regressions in Table 3 provide strong support for the increasingly well-established finding that liberals and conservatives differ in their disgust sensitivity and in the intensity and ultimate moral consequences of their disgust response. Across all of the emotion induction conditions, for both ends of the political spectrum, only conservatives in the disgust condition expressed a mean response that was statistically distinguishable from the control condition. The effect of incidental disgust on this particular

variable was experienced only by conservatives. In Table 4, I report results for the scale variable, taxes variable, and petition variable by ideology.

**Table 4:** OLS- Emotions study- ideological differences on select child hunger variables

VARIABLES	Petition	Petition	Taxes	Taxes	Scale	Scale
	(Model 3) Liberal	(Model 4) Conservative	(Model 5) Liberal	(Model 6) Conservative	(Model 7) Liberal	(Model 8) Conservative
Control/Constant	5.349*** (0.268)	5.943*** (0.383)	5.118*** (0.283)	5.176*** (0.399)	5.310*** (0.186)	5.540*** (0.283)
Anger	0.133 (0.183)	0.0715 (0.267)	-0.103 (0.193)	0.153 (0.279)	0.0613 (0.127)	0.115 (0.197)
Disgust	0.137 (0.180)	-0.463* (0.271)	0.0860 (0.190)	-0.651** (0.283)	0.122 (0.124)	-0.364* (0.200)
Sadness	0.0687 (0.185)	0.0145 (0.265)	-0.0899 (0.195)	-0.221 (0.277)	0.0132 (0.128)	0.00561 (0.196)
Happiness	-0.0222 (0.176)	-0.108 (0.262)	-0.105 (0.186)	-0.238 (0.274)	0.00760 (0.122)	-0.113 (0.194)
Age	-0.138*** (0.0455)	-0.152** (0.0667)	-0.0973** (0.0480)	-0.0610 (0.0695)	-0.0730** (0.0315)	-0.0816* (0.0494)
Income	-0.0136 (0.0264)	-0.0346 (0.0367)	0.00299 (0.0279)	-0.0307 (0.0382)	-0.00588 (0.0183)	-0.0210 (0.0271)
Women	0.282** (0.117)	0.494*** (0.171)	0.0899 (0.124)	0.183 (0.179)	0.205** (0.0813)	0.334*** (0.127)
Pol. Knowledge	0.248 (0.174)	-0.904*** (0.242)	0.161 (0.184)	-0.646** (0.252)	0.153 (0.121)	-0.512*** (0.179)
Race (white)	0.127 (0.131)	-0.733*** (0.223)	0.0980 (0.138)	-0.454* (0.232)	0.0695 (0.0903)	-0.463*** (0.165)
Observations	686	475	686	474	686	475
R-squared	0.026	0.117	0.010	0.058	0.021	0.088

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

The results in Table 4 are consistent with those in Table 3: namely, that incidental disgust motivated conservatives to hold more punitive views on child hunger relief than individuals of either ideology in any other condition. The mean response changes for conservatives in the disgust condition were also substantively large. For example, in Model 2 of Table 3 and Model 6 of Table 4, conservative mean responses decreased with respect to the control by -0.501 and -0.651, respectively—among the largest changes in mean response of any analyses within this dissertation.

In addition to the questions about child hunger in Chapter 1, recall that subjects were also presented with a scenario describing refugees. Did political ideology have any significant influence on the relationship between incidental emotion and the responses to the refugee questions? Table 5 displays the results for a selection of those five variables, as well as the broader scale variable.



**Table 5:** OLS- Emotions study- ideological differences on select refugee variables

VARIABLES	Admit US	Admit US	Petition	Petition	Scale	Scale
	(Model 9) Liberal	(Model 10) Conservative	(Model 11) Liberal	(Model 12) Conservative	(Model 13) Liberal	(Model 14) Conservative
Control/Constant	4.885*** (0.247)	4.499*** (0.343)	4.902*** (0.293)	4.709*** (0.395)	5.036*** (0.227)	4.687*** (0.318)
Anger	0.372** (0.169)	0.338 (0.239)	0.343* (0.200)	0.329 (0.276)	0.324** (0.155)	0.314 (0.221)
Disgust	0.432*** (0.166)	-0.250 (0.243)	0.429** (0.196)	-0.0656 (0.280)	0.364** (0.152)	-0.207 (0.225)
Sadness	0.316* (0.170)	0.150 (0.238)	0.327 (0.202)	0.381 (0.274)	0.240 (0.156)	0.265 (0.220)
Happiness	0.0707 (0.162)	-0.230 (0.235)	-0.0375 (0.192)	0.148 (0.271)	0.0682 (0.149)	0.0146 (0.218)
Age	-0.105** (0.0420)	0.00164 (0.0598)	-0.162*** (0.0497)	-0.133* (0.0689)	-0.142*** (0.0385)	-0.0596 (0.0554)
Income	-0.0321 (0.0244)	0.0643* (0.0328)	-0.0157 (0.0288)	0.0272 (0.0379)	-0.0258 (0.0223)	0.0295 (0.0304)
Women	0.367*** (0.108)	0.156 (0.153)	0.521*** (0.128)	0.370** (0.177)	0.393*** (0.0993)	0.235* (0.142)
Pol. Knowledge	0.279* (0.161)	-1.011*** (0.217)	0.331* (0.190)	-1.018*** (0.250)	0.222 (0.147)	-0.844*** (0.201)
Race (white)	0.228* (0.120)	-0.251 (0.199)	0.186 (0.142)	-0.661*** (0.230)	0.0973 (0.110)	-0.590*** (0.185)
Observations	686	475	684	475	686	475
R-squared	0.051	0.079	0.056	0.097	0.057	0.099

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.

Remarkably, Table 5 displays that liberals showed a pattern of significant changes with respect to the control when experiencing incidental disgust, but conservatives did not. Additionally, liberals experiencing incidental anger showed a similar pattern in these three models, and sadness also had an effect in Model 9. While disgust *decreased* conservatives' support for hunger relief in Table 4, disgust and anger for liberals *increased* their support for refugee human rights in Table 5. In short, incidental disgust caused conservatives to express attitudes more opposed to hunger relief, and liberals to express attitudes more supportive of refugee rights. The two ends of the political spectrum experienced the effects of incidental emotion in fundamentally different ways.

In Chapter 2, I moved beyond incidental emotion and looked more closely at how negatively-valenced human rights imagery and associated gain/loss messages affected individuals' support for child hunger relief. The main findings were that negative messages outperformed positive messages, and that approach-gains messages were more effective than avoid-loss messages. However, I also noted the persistent significant effect that ideology had in each of the models in which it was included. Repeating the processes used to consider ideology in Tables 3-5 above, Table 6 displays how liberals and conservatives responded differently to the experimental treatments used in Chapter 2.

**Table 6: OLS- Bias study- ideological differences on select variables**

VARIABLES	Petition	Petition	Taxes	Taxes	Child Rights	Child Rights	Scale	Scale
	(Model 15)	(Model 16)	(Model 17)	(Model 18)	(Model 19)	(Model 20)	(Model 21)	(Model 22)
	Liberal	Conservative	Liberal	Conservative	Liberal	Conservative	Liberal	Conservative
Constant	6.145*** (0.268)	6.101*** (0.336)	5.741*** (0.312)	5.701*** (0.361)	5.997*** (0.205)	5.596*** (0.233)	5.909*** (0.231)	5.899*** (0.264)
Pos Image, Gain	0.204 (0.189)	0.0180 (0.240)	0.230 (0.221)	-0.141 (0.258)	-0.0864 (0.145)	0.198 (0.166)	0.148 (0.163)	0.107 (0.188)
Pos Image, Loss	0.169 (0.198)	0.0316 (0.227)	0.390* (0.231)	0.0403 (0.244)	0.0865 (0.152)	0.193 (0.157)	0.279 (0.170)	0.0649 (0.178)
Neg Image, Gain	0.239 (0.188)	0.401* (0.239)	0.349 (0.220)	0.492* (0.257)	0.213 (0.144)	0.495*** (0.166)	0.311* (0.162)	0.433** (0.188)
Neg Image, Loss	-0.129 (0.197)	0.217 (0.234)	0.315 (0.230)	0.232 (0.252)	-0.177 (0.151)	0.177 (0.162)	0.0822 (0.170)	0.259 (0.184)
Age	-0.00827** (0.00397)	-0.0199*** (0.00488)	-0.0180*** (0.00463)	-0.0259*** (0.00524)	0.00198 (0.00304)	-0.00124 (0.00338)	-0.0132*** (0.00342)	-0.0206*** (0.00383)
Woman	-0.208* (0.123)	0.0313 (0.155)	-0.249* (0.144)	-0.291* (0.167)	0.222** (0.0947)	0.177 (0.108)	-0.0577 (0.106)	-0.0393 (0.122)
White	0.124 (0.147)	-0.0199 (0.191)	0.155 (0.172)	-0.127 (0.205)	0.334*** (0.113)	0.0372 (0.133)	0.0716 (0.127)	-0.0445 (0.150)
Income	-0.0160 (0.0513)	-0.0111 (0.0647)	-0.0947 (0.0600)	0.00838 (0.0695)	-0.0673* (0.0394)	0.128*** (0.0448)	0.0149 (0.0442)	0.0587 (0.0508)
Education	0.0277 (0.0417)	0.0117 (0.0582)	0.140*** (0.0486)	0.00291 (0.0625)	0.0107 (0.0320)	-0.0342 (0.0403)	0.0423 (0.0359)	-0.0277 (0.0457)
Pol. Knowledge	0.144 (0.137)	-0.341** (0.172)	-0.139 (0.160)	-0.200 (0.184)	0.203* (0.105)	-0.000538 (0.119)	-0.104 (0.118)	-0.199 (0.135)
Observations	456	511	456	511	456	511	456	511
R-squared	0.029	0.062	0.070	0.079	0.064	0.044	0.056	0.084

Standard errors in parentheses  
\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 6 presents a display of 3 of the 5 variables from Chapter 2, as well as the scale variable capturing subjects' underlying disposition towards the global child hunger issues. The table reveals that the effects of the negative image, gain message were disproportionately driven by the responses of the conservative respondents. While the scale variable (Model 21) reveals that the same negative-gain message did have a significant influence on the attitudes of liberals overall, the substantive effect for conservatives (Model 22) was considerably larger. In fact, leaving aside the scale variable, the only experimental treatment that had a weakly ( $p=0.092$ ) significant effect on liberal attitudes was the positive image, avoid loss condition in Model 17. Taken together, conservatives in the negative image, gains condition responded much more strongly than liberals in the same condition, and much more strongly than conservatives or liberals in the other experimental conditions. The effects for conservatives in this condition were also substantively large: the negative image, gains coefficients in Models 16, 18, 20, and 22 are considerably larger than the coefficients on other variables in Table 6.

## 5. Discussion

In this chapter, I have re-considered the findings of the experiments in Chapters 1 and 2 in light of political ideology. I presented evidence from existing literature for suspecting that liberals and conservatives may respond quite differently to human rights messages, and I found considerable evidence that this was the case. First, I note wide baseline differences in the attitudes of liberals and conservatives on each of the 15 dependent variables in the two experiments, including in the younger and more liberal Mturk sample and in the more representative Qualtrics sample. Next, I showed that conservatives in the disgust condition differed significantly from the control in the child hunger portion of the Chapter 1 experiment, and that no other emotional conditions for either side of the

ideological spectrum had a distinguishable effect. I noted that this effect was to decrease conservatives' support for the human rights of starving children.

While the disgust condition prompted conservatives to express less supportive attitudes towards hunger relief, I found that the negative image, gains condition in the Chapter 2 experiment had the opposite effect. Among all treatment conditions in both experiments, only the negative image, gains condition consistently resulted in conservative attitudes that were more supportive of rights issues when compared to the control.

This latter result is consistent with the literature on conservatism and the negativity bias. Multiple studies have shown that conservatives experience the negativity bias more intensely than liberals, and that differences in conservative and liberal experiences of the negativity bias explain ideological variations in political attitudes (Hibbing, Smith, & Alford 2014; Ahn, et al. 2014; Jost, et al. 2003). Based on this literature, we might expect that negative imagery would have a greater effect on conservatives than liberals, and that this would manifest in subsequent changes in mean responses to survey questions with respect to the control.

Similarly, I provided some informed conjectures in Chapter 1 regarding the reasons why conservatives in the disgust condition would become less supportive of child hunger relief. While my original hypothesis was that the discomfort of incidental disgust would lead to increased willingness to support the human rights of starving children, I may have underestimated the degree to which the experience of disgust is particularly unpleasant for conservatives. A brief scan of the written responses to the disgust prompt for conservatives reveals some genuinely disturbing content:

“Rotten food and trash, especially maggots make me feel disgusted. The smell when you open up a trash can in summer, with the stale smell of rot and millions of

maggots crawling all over the can.”

Similar topics often seem to appear in conservative responses to the disgust prompt:

“I feel disgusted whenever I see anything that has to do with eye injuries. I can’t stand looking at any injuries that involve eyes. I feel disgusted when I’m camping or hiking and use one of the outhouses at the campsite or trailhead, and someone has decided to not use the toilet and instead do their business on the floor in front of or next to the toilet. I see this more often than not.”

Liberal responses to the disgust prompt, by contrast, often seem to invoke “disgusting” ideas or unjust behaviors, rather than bodily injury, fluids, and contamination:

“I feel disgusted when I see lots of little [trash] strewn accords public parks, when I see someone taking advantage of someone weaker than them, or trying to show how tough they are by preying on the weak. I also feel disgusted when people are making crude jokes about women.”

Another liberal wrote:

“what makes me disgusted is when i see someone abusing an animal it ticks me off to no end. animals should be loved always. theres a purpose for all and abusing them is disgusting and just wrong.”

It’s possible that conservatives’ experiences of disgust were upsetting enough that they were simply less able to provide “positive” answers to the child hunger questions than liberals or conservatives in the other experimental groups. In order to disentangle this possibility, future research could explore the ways in which disgust and its variations influence conservative views on rights issues in both incidental and integral emotional scenarios.

Moving now to the unique ways that liberals responded to the two experiments,

perhaps the most notable finding is that left-of-center individuals did not consistently respond to any of the picture/message combinations in the Chapter 2 bias experiment in a way that was statistically distinguishable from the control condition. A possible explanation for this finding is that, while liberals do exhibit an attentional preference for the negative, their experience of the negativity bias is less pronounced than conservatives (Hibbing, Smith, & Alford 2014; Ahn, et al. 2014; Jost, et al. 2003). As a result, their attitudes were not as deeply affected by the negative image of starving children as those of conservatives.

A more plausible explanation, in my view, for the lack of changes in liberal attitudes in the bias study and the child hunger portion of the emotions study is simply that baseline attitudes in the control conditions were already in the “high support” category. In the bias experiment, the mean response to the 5 questions for liberals in the control condition was 5.50. With the highest possible response being 7 (“strongly agree”), there may not have been enough room for variation to be captured. The same issue may explain why none of the emotion induction conditions led to changes in liberal responses to the child hunger questions in the Chapter 1 emotions experiment. For those 5 questions, the mean response for liberals in the control condition was 5.39—subjects answering above the mean had less than 2 points of wiggle-room with respect to the control.

By way of contrast, the mean response for liberals in the control condition on the 5 refugee questions was 5.03; and while only 1 of the 10 child hunger questions in control conditions of the bias and emotion experiments had mean responses below 5 for liberals, 2 of the 5 refugee questions did. That may explain why anger and disgust were revealed to have consistent effects in the refugee portion of the emotions experiment—liberal attitudes were finally skeptical enough at baseline to have room to move upwards.

The same phenomenon may explain why there were no observed effects of the

emotion conditions for conservatives on the refugee questions—though to a somewhat lesser degree. The mean response for conservatives on the refugee questions was 3.58, the lowest/least-supportive average by a substantial margin when compared to mean conservative attitudes on the 10 child hunger questions. Conservative responses on the refugee questions thus may have already approached their lower-bound in the control condition.

In the final analysis, the emotions experiment shows that rather than changing the direction of support for human rights issues, incidental emotions of disgust (and, for liberals, anger), led both conservatives and liberals to express more extreme versions of their preexisting biases. Liberals, already predisposed to support refugee issues—but with some room to grow—translated their incidental anger and disgust into more intense levels of support. Conservatives, by contrast, already somewhat doubtful of the degree to which they, or the United States, should be expected to help starving children in far-away places, translated their disgust into more intensely stringent views. The moral “amplification” properties of disgust are supported by these findings.

If there is a hopeful spot in these findings for HROs seeking to create information that changes, rather than simply reinforces, existing views, the results for political conservatives in the bias experiment is where they would find it. Political conservatives exposed to negative imagery, with an associated message emphasizing clear rewards for both the victims and their benefactors, consistently and substantially reported a greater willingness to contribute to the cause. Across all of the empirical models in this paper, the largest positive effect was the one that this message combination had on conservatives’ support for hungry, foreign children. It is my sincere privilege to take that hopeful note away from this dissertation as the germ upon which to build a fruitful, practically-focused research career.



## CONCLUSION

In the introduction to this dissertation, I set out to describe a substantial gap in the academic literature on international human rights. Existing empirical work on human rights, such as Fariss (2014), has tended to focus on the aggregate effects of human rights institutions. These “top-down” analyses have considered state-level or regional changes as a result of the human rights regime, and significant effects have been difficult to isolate. Despite the prevalence of these top-down analyses, our central theories of how human rights lead to change include a key role for domestic audiences and individuals (Simmons 2009; Keck & Sikkink 1998). Furthermore, HROs operating in the field devote a considerable amount of their efforts and resources to recruiting advocates from advanced, wealthy democracies like the United States. These advocates supply HROs with funds and foot soldiers to apply pressure on rights abusing states from “above,” in conjunction with domestic individuals and groups applying pressure from within the state, from “below.” In short, real-world HROs and prominent academic theories emphasize citizen mobilization, but empirical scholarship largely has not.

I argued that understanding how variations in the content of campaigns affect individual willingness to act may provide a missing piece of the causal puzzle. Specifically, I argued that a promising place to begin this type of research program is to consider how human rights information is processed by the fast, automatic cognitive processes associated with System 1. Because human rights issues so often deal with matters of survival, pain, suffering, and death--the old, animalistic part of our brains is likely to play an important role in how we respond to this information. Existing literature within political psychology outlines certain well-established System 1 biases that seemed likely to have a particularly significant impact on individuals’ reaction to human rights issues. Thus, I argued that a

thorough investigation of the effects of System 1 biases on individuals' interpretation of HR information is appropriate for both academic and practical purposes. The three empirical chapters of the dissertation set out to identify the ways in which incidental emotion, the negativity bias and loss aversion, and non-conscious ideological predispositions affected the responses of individuals to human rights information.

In Chapter 1, I set out to identify how incidental emotions affect individuals' response to HR information. While I hypothesized that disgust would increase support for rights and anger would decrease it, I found the opposite. While incidental emotion had a consistent effect, it was largely contingent on subjects' political ideology. Political liberals who were angry or disgusted exhibited increased support for the rights of refugees, while political conservatives who were disgusted exhibited decreased support for child hunger relief. Ultimately, I found that incidental emotions may amplify existing attitudes about human rights, rather than change them.

In Chapter 2, I considered how the negativity bias and the loss-aversion bias may influence the ways in which we interpret human rights information. I argued that negative human rights stimuli was likely to increase subjects' attention, but may lead to disengagement. I hypothesized that combining negative imagery with an avoid-loss frame may offset this disengagement and increase support for human rights and intentions to act. Using an experiment to compare the effects of different frames, I found that a negative image combined with a message emphasizing potential gains—not the avoidance of losses—significantly outperformed the rest. Again, however, this result was highly sensitive to the political ideology of participants, a result I investigated further in chapter 3.

In Chapter 3, I outlined a growing but now well-established body of literature finding that political ideology is a reflection of, or proxy for, certain deep-seated variations in System 1 biases. Among the findings of this literature is that ideological conservatives are more sensitive to negativity and disgust than liberals. I argued that the results of the experiments I described in Chapters 1 and 2 provide support for this, indicating that variations in System 1 biases as reflected in political ideology could be a fruitful ground for understanding variations in how individuals respond to human rights information. More importantly, I show that despite wide baseline differences in their views on human rights issues, both liberals and conservatives became more supportive of rights issues—and showed a greater willingness to act—in response to certain types of messaging. Specifically, liberals became more supportive of refugee rights when primed to experience negative emotions, especially incidental anger and disgust. Conservatives became more supportive of global hunger relief when exposed to negative imagery with associated messaging focused on gains. Ultimately, Chapter 3 illustrates that the effects of System 1 biases on our responses to human rights information are not universal, but they do vary in systematic ways that align with individuals’ political ideology.

What are the implications of the empirical findings outlined in Chapters 1-3? From a purely academic perspective, these results show that individuals’ decisions to support (or ignore) human rights campaigns is likely affected in systematic ways by intrinsic cognitive biases. While certain “accidental” factors like timing, political relevance, location in the news cycle, and other factors related to pure chance almost certainly explain variations in why and how certain campaigns gain traction while others do not, the findings outlined above show that bias has systematic, predictable effects in how HR campaign information leads to changes in belief and intended action. Incorporating what we know about bias into broader

theories about the effects of human rights campaigns on human rights outcomes is likely to create not just a more descriptively accurate picture, but one that helps us understand why some campaigns succeed in attracting supporters while others do not. More broadly, this dissertation provides a test case, or proving ground, for the utility of existing literature in political psychology and other behavioral sciences for providing many new, unexplored, and potentially fruitful approaches to studying the relationship between the content of human rights campaigns, the psychology of individuals, and the probability of individual action.

However, as I argued in the introductory chapter, the focus of the research described in this dissertation is fundamentally practical. What are the implications for Human Rights Organizations operating in the field, right now? Of course, we can't draw any firm conclusions based on a small handful of studies alone. The prospects for future investigations are, as I describe in the preceding paragraph, both straightforward and likely to be fruitful. Still, Chapter 1 provides preliminary evidence that negative emotions can be an effective tool in amplifying existing attitudes and making action more likely. Political liberals, already disposed to support the rights of refugees, exhibited significantly more willingness to take action on these beliefs when experiencing incidental anger or disgust. When targeting liberals—now a matter of course due to available data from social media—a promising strategy seems to be the use of emotionally-charged stimuli.

Furthermore, HROs would be wise to consider the use of negative imagery more widely. An anecdotal review of the emails I receive from HROs include lots of smiling, well-fed children and happy mothers with associated calls to provide monetary assistance to prevent their starvation. These messages may be less likely to create disengagement than images of starving mothers and children, but also less likely to capture attention. Chapter 2

shows that combining negative imagery with gains-focused messaging may be significantly more productive than any combination of messaging with positive imagery. Examining this finding on new samples of individuals and on different human rights topics will further reveal the important implications of the negativity bias and loss aversion bias on individuals' willingness to take action in response to human rights campaign materials. When the availability of monetary resources are the only thing standing between humanitarian agencies and the survival of families, the implications of this research are, to say the least, potentially significant.

Finally, Chapter 3 provides an important caveat to these practical implications. Keeping the intended audience in mind is critical. Political ideology, an important and widely-investigated proxy for apparent variations in deep-seated cognitive biases, had a decisive impact on the effects of different types of information. Again, social media and other forms of obtainable browsing history make targeted messaging a matter of routine. Tailoring different messages for liberals and conservatives is absolutely vital to any human rights campaign interested in building a diverse coalition of advocates immune to the effects of ideology and political partisanship. And online marketing isn't the only place we might expect HROs to make this kind of distinction—a message asking a church in Mississippi to provide host families or funds for refugees from the Congo should be crafted very differently than the same message targeted to college undergraduates at NYU. When crafting a human rights campaign, the audience of each and every message should be considered and the message tailored respectively.

As a final note, I'd like to anticipate and respond to a common critique of this research agenda. When presenting research like I've outlined in this dissertation, on more

than one occasion I've received comments that it seems under-handed, manipulative, or disrespectful of the clear-eyed processes of democratic deliberation which are, themselves, part of the human rights corpus. Shouldn't we seek to provide thoughtful, rational reasons to support human rights, instead of leveraging cognitive biases and predispositions that may or may not have any rational justification? This argument, while certainly understandable and a product of good faith, simply ignores the stakes involved. Given the stakes at hand—literally the lives of the world's most desperate and vulnerable people—it would be a grievous mistake to ignore what we know about persuasion in building a coalition to come to their aid. Furthermore, simply having a conversation often involves our own use of “folk” persuasiveness—talking to my partner about where to eat might involve suggestions that she has liked similar food before, or that people she trusts reported liking the place, or that the owner happens to be a supporter of our favorite political candidate. Why should human rights advocates consciously force themselves to employ only folk-level persuasive techniques? I argue that it would be an unjustifiable disservice to the victims of human rights abuse to refuse the use of social science in making arguments in favor of their protection. This is doubly true when the opponents of human rights protections, including authoritarian states like Russia or corporate conglomerates like Exxon-Mobil or the Koch Foundation, are well-funded, strong, mobilized, and employing every advertising tactic available to sustain (or reverse) the status quo. Refusing the use of scientific knowledge about persuasion is nothing less than a self-imposed handicap against these regressive forces, and one that treats the most vulnerable human beings as collateral in a misguided quest to sustain the moral high-ground.

## Appendix A: Descriptive Statistics

### Emotions Experiment

	Full Sample	Control	Anger	Disgust	Sad	Happy
<b>N</b>	1,039	258	244	242	236	260
<b>Age: under 44*</b>	73%	72%	74%	71%	74%	75%
<b>Income: under 75,000</b>	67%	63%	69%	68%	73%	64%
<b>Women</b>	57%	57%	61%	55%	61%	52%
<b>Education: some college, no degree</b>	42%	38%	44%	44%	47%	40%
<b>White/Caucasian</b>	76%	75%	74%	77%	76%	77%
<b>Knowledge: Reps more conservative than dems</b>	86%	87%	84%	85%	84%	88%
<b>Conservatives</b>	41%	39%	42%	39%	44%	41%

### Bias Experiment

	Full Sample	Control	Pos, Gain	Pos, Loss	Neg, Gain	Neg, Loss
<b>N</b>	1,240	205	209	214	209	202
<b>Age: mean, sd*</b>	44, 16.5	43, 15.8	45, 16.4	43, 16.5	44, 17.1	44, 17.1
<b>Income: under 75,000</b>	58%	60%	56%	63%	56%	58%
<b>Women</b>	51%	55%	53%	51%	45%	52%
<b>Education: some college, no degree</b>	46%	45%	44%	48%	49%	47%
<b>White/Caucasian</b>	68%	66%	69%	70%	66%	66%
<b>Knowledge: Reps more conservative than dems</b>	67%	65%	67%	62%	72%	71%
<b>Conservatives</b>	53%	55%	48%	58%	48%	55%

\*Age was recorded as continuous in the Bias Experiment, but ordinal in the Emotions Experiment

### Bias Experiment: by Ideology

	Full Sample		Control		Pos, Gain		Pos, Loss		Neg, Gain		Neg, loss	
	Libs	Cons	Libs	Cons	Libs	Cons	Libs	Cons	Libs	Cons	Libs	Cons
<b>N</b>	456	511	86	104	100	94	84	117	103	95	83	101
<b>Age: mean, sd</b>	43, 16	45, 17	43, 17	43, 15	43, 15	48, 18	43, 18	44, 16	41, 17	47, 17	43, 17	46, 17
<b>Income: under 75,000</b>	58%	57%	53%	63%	56%	55%	63%	60%	57%	53%	60%	53%
<b>Women</b>	52%	52%	60%	52%	54%	56%	45%	55%	46%	46%	54%	50%
<b>Education: some college, no degree</b>	41%	48%	47%	40%	37%	49%	34%	54%	47%	46%	40%	50%
<b>White/Caucasian</b>	67%	72%	70%	65%	69%	77%	65%	75%	59%	76%	71%	66%

<b>Knowledge: Reps more conservative than dems</b>	68%	68%	70%	64%	64%	68%	63%	62%	70%	76%	75%	70%
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### Emotions Experiment: by Ideology

	Full Sample		Control		Anger		Disgust		Sad		Happy	
	Libs	Cons	Libs	Cons	Libs	Cons	Libs	Cons	Libs	Cons	Libs	Cons
<b>N</b>	706	485	149	94	135	97	141	89	128	100	152	104
<b>Age: under 44</b>	75%	71%	73%	72%	73%	76%	76%	64%	74%	73%	79%	70%
<b>Income: under 75,000</b>	70%	61%	64%	59%	74%	59%	70%	61%	78%	66%	63%	63%
<b>Women</b>	60%	55%	56%	56%	65%	56%	59%	54%	60%	64%	59%	44%
<b>Education: some college, no degree</b>	41%	43%	37%	37%	44%	42%	40%	47%	41%	53%	42%	37%
<b>White/Caucasian</b>	73%	81%	71%	81%	72%	79%	73%	83%	72%	80%	75%	80%
<b>Knowledge: Reps more conservative than dems</b>	87%	85%	91%	83%	86%	82%	84%	87%	84%	84%	88%	88%



## Appendix B: Sensitivity Analyses

### Emotions Experiment

To test the sensitivity of the models, we can re-run the regressions with certain control variables added and subtracted. This tells us whether the sign and p-value associated with the IV coefficients is the product of some omitted variable bias, or whether the coefficients are sensitive to the inclusion of other variables in the model.

First, recall that the scale variable measuring responses on the “hunger” variables did not indicate significant effects for the IVs in any of the models, and the scale variable combining all of the hunger and refugee questions only indicated weakly significant effects for the “anger” variable—and only when certain controls were included. The effects of the “anger” variable were likely driven entirely by the 5 “refugee” questions. For those reasons, I report a sensitivity analysis of the scale variable compiled by the 5 refugee questions in the emotions experiment. Table 1 displays the results below.

**Table 1: Emotions Experiment: Scale of Refugee Questions**

VARIABLES	(Model 1) SCALE	(Model 2) SCALE	(Model 3) SCALE	(Model 4) SCALE	(Model 5) SCALE	(Model 6) SCALE	(Model 7) SCALE	(Model 8) SCALE	(Model 9) SCALE	(Model 10) SCALE
Constant	4.463*** (0.100)	4.953*** (0.141)	5.212*** (0.167)	4.958*** (0.174)	5.067*** (0.201)	5.200*** (0.207)	5.574*** (0.189)	5.184*** (0.227)	5.414*** (0.300)	6.129*** (0.306)
Anger	0.299** (0.144)	0.279* (0.142)	0.274* (0.144)	0.264* (0.143)	0.261* (0.143)	0.266* (0.144)	0.310** (0.130)	0.320** (0.130)	0.321** (0.130)	0.265** (0.127)
Disgust	0.120 (0.144)	0.124 (0.143)	0.124 (0.143)	0.144 (0.143)	0.141 (0.143)	0.140 (0.143)	0.120 (0.130)	0.132 (0.129)	0.131 (0.129)	0.0840 (0.126)
Sadness	0.159 (0.145)	0.139 (0.143)	0.116 (0.145)	0.110 (0.144)	0.107 (0.144)	0.117 (0.144)	0.229* (0.130)	0.244* (0.130)	0.242* (0.130)	0.207 (0.127)
Happiness	0.00688 (0.141)	-0.0159 (0.140)	0.00451 (0.141)	0.0279 (0.140)	0.0307 (0.140)	0.0306 (0.140)	0.0493 (0.126)	0.0613 (0.126)	0.0604 (0.126)	0.00495 (0.123)
Age		-0.171*** (0.0349)	-0.171*** (0.0351)	-0.175*** (0.0350)	-0.171*** (0.0352)	-0.157*** (0.0357)	-0.118*** (0.0324)	-0.127*** (0.0325)	-0.127*** (0.0325)	-0.135*** (0.0317)
Income			-0.0626*** (0.0201)	-0.0573*** (0.0200)	-0.0560*** (0.0200)	-0.0477** (0.0202)	-0.00790 (0.0184)	-0.0242 (0.0191)	-0.0260 (0.0191)	-0.0186 (0.0187)
Women				0.416*** (0.0918)	0.413*** (0.0919)	0.424*** (0.0922)	0.348*** (0.0833)	0.369*** (0.0833)	0.373*** (0.0834)	0.405*** (0.0814)
Knowledge					-0.145 (0.132)	-0.128 (0.133)	-0.250** (0.121)	-0.263** (0.120)	-0.253** (0.121)	-0.315*** (0.118)
White						-0.299*** (0.108)	-0.148 (0.0985)	-0.142 (0.0982)	-0.00667 (0.152)	-0.0638 (0.148)
Conservative							-1.537*** (0.0846)	-1.513*** (0.0847)	-1.512*** (0.0846)	-1.401*** (0.0837)
Education								0.105*** (0.0343)	0.104*** (0.0343)	0.0865** (0.0336)
Party ID									-0.0734 (0.0624)	-0.0510 (0.0609)
Pol. Self-Image										-0.207*** (0.0265)
Observations	1,240	1,238	1,221	1,217	1,217	1,206	1,161	1,161	1,161	1,161
R-squared	0.005	0.023	0.031	0.047	0.048	0.053	0.264	0.270	0.271	0.308

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table 1: Emotions Experiment: Scale of Refugee Questions, Continued**

VARIABLES	(Model 11) SCALE	(Model 12) SCALE
Constant	5.838*** (0.233)	5.227*** (0.272)
Anger	0.266** (0.125)	0.290** (0.145)
Disgust	0.0856 (0.125)	0.116 (0.145)
Sadness	0.212* (0.125)	0.150 (0.146)
Happiness	-0.000149 (0.121)	0.0287 (0.142)
Age	-0.142*** (0.0309)	
Women	0.405*** (0.0804)	
Knowledge	-0.323*** (0.115)	
Conservative	-1.434*** (0.0817)	
Education	0.0771** (0.0320)	
Pol Self-Image	-0.204*** (0.0260)	
Income		-0.0538*** (0.0205)
White		-0.190 (0.165)
Party ID		-0.0887 (0.0684)
Observations	1,186	1,210
R-squared	0.305	0.021

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

In Models 11 of Table 1, I include only those variables found to have consistently significant effects on the IVs. In Model 12, I include only those variables found to have consistently insignificant effects. For example, the significant effects of income and white self-identification drop out when ideology is added to the model. Taken together, the various combinations of control variables have relatively marginal effects on the coefficient for

Anger (significant in all models). Anger has a positive effect on support for the rights of refugees ranging from 0.299-0.261, an average coefficient of 0.276. When political ideology is included as a control variable, the Anger coefficient ranges from 0.266-0.321, with an average of 0.296. Ultimately, the analysis allows us to conclude that, while certain control variables are included for theoretical reasons discussed in the body of the manuscript, the models do not appear to be particularly sensitive to any combination or inclusion/exclusion of control variables.

### Bias Experiment

The bias experiment was conducted on the Qualtrics qBus platform, so a larger number of potential control variables were possible for inclusion in the models. In Table 2 below, I report the results of a fuller analysis of the experimental treatments as they relate to the scale of the 5 hunger-related dependent variables.

**Table 2: Bias Experiment: Scale of Hunger Questions**

VARIABLES	(Model 13) SCALE	(Model 14) SCALE	(Model 15) SCALE	(Model 16) SCALE	(Model 17) SCALE	(Model 18) SCALE
Constant	5.971*** (0.136)	5.878*** (0.150)	5.791*** (0.160)	5.780*** (0.175)	5.804*** (0.175)	5.797*** (0.176)
Pos, Gain	0.173 (0.125)	0.172 (0.125)	0.168 (0.125)	0.168 (0.125)	0.167 (0.125)	0.167 (0.125)
Pos, Loss	0.125 (0.124)	0.126 (0.124)	0.126 (0.124)	0.127 (0.124)	0.122 (0.124)	0.125 (0.124)
Neg, Gain	0.387*** (0.125)	0.386*** (0.125)	0.389*** (0.125)	0.390*** (0.125)	0.400*** (0.125)	0.399*** (0.125)
Neg, Loss	0.183 (0.126)	0.182 (0.126)	0.183 (0.126)	0.183 (0.126)	0.191 (0.126)	0.190 (0.126)
Age	-0.0193*** (0.00238)	-0.0200*** (0.00243)	-0.0201*** (0.00243)	-0.0201*** (0.00246)	-0.0191*** (0.00252)	-0.0188*** (0.00259)
Income		0.0407 (0.0274)	0.0141 (0.0323)	0.0141 (0.0324)	0.0185 (0.0324)	0.0251 (0.0344)
Education			0.0442 (0.0285)	0.0447 (0.0287)	0.0501* (0.0289)	0.0507* (0.0289)
Women				0.0126 (0.0806)	0.00779 (0.0806)	0.0144 (0.0815)
Knowledge					-0.150* (0.0895)	-0.145 (0.0900)
White						-0.0566 (0.0977)
Observations	1,039	1,039	1,039	1,039	1,039	1,039
R-squared	0.067	0.069	0.072	0.072	0.074	0.074

Standard errors in parentheses  
 \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table 2: Bias Experiment: Scale of Hunger Questions, Continued**

VARIABLES	(Model 19) SCALE	(Model 20) SCALE	(Model 21) SCALE	(Model 22) SCALE	(Model 23) SCALE	(Model 24) SCALE	(Model 25) SCALE	(Model 26) SCALE
Constant	6.200*** (0.181)	6.641*** (0.225)	6.709*** (0.228)	6.585*** (0.245)	6.358*** (0.301)	6.419*** (0.325)	6.591*** (0.217)	4.670*** (0.220)
Pos, Gain	0.125 (0.124)	0.119 (0.124)	0.127 (0.124)	0.117 (0.124)	0.124 (0.124)	0.125 (0.124)	0.117 (0.124)	0.170 (0.128)
Pos, Loss	0.164 (0.123)	0.139 (0.123)	0.134 (0.123)	0.126 (0.123)	0.129 (0.123)	0.127 (0.123)	0.126 (0.122)	0.152 (0.127)
Neg, Gain	0.361*** (0.124)	0.338*** (0.124)	0.341*** (0.123)	0.337*** (0.123)	0.335*** (0.123)	0.335*** (0.123)	0.338*** (0.123)	0.388*** (0.128)
Neg, Loss	0.182 (0.126)	0.179 (0.125)	0.171 (0.125)	0.166 (0.125)	0.172 (0.125)	0.170 (0.125)	0.166 (0.125)	0.190 (0.129)
Age	-0.0169*** (0.00258)	-0.0169*** (0.00257)	-0.0146*** (0.00288)	-0.0137*** (0.00295)	-0.0123*** (0.00313)	-0.0124*** (0.00314)	-0.0134*** (0.00273)	
Income	0.0342 (0.0338)	0.0231 (0.0338)	0.0137 (0.0342)	0.00939 (0.0343)	0.0186 (0.0350)	0.0191 (0.0351)		0.0429 (0.0361)
Education	0.0128 (0.0288)	0.00857 (0.0286)	-0.000681 (0.0291)	-0.00191 (0.0291)	0.000735 (0.0291)	8.34e-05 (0.0292)		0.0516* (0.0295)
Women	-0.0414 (0.0811)	-0.0263 (0.0809)	-0.00840 (0.0814)	-0.0204 (0.0818)	-0.0181 (0.0818)	-0.0163 (0.0819)		0.122 (0.0821)
Knowledge	-0.160* (0.0897)	-0.215** (0.0909)	-0.216** (0.0908)	-0.197** (0.0918)	-0.195** (0.0918)	-0.193** (0.0919)	-0.194** (0.0901)	
White	0.00406 (0.0984)	-0.00344 (0.0980)	-0.00149 (0.0979)	-0.00278 (0.0978)	0.0118 (0.0984)	0.00727 (0.0989)		-0.195** (0.0985)
Conservative	-0.608*** (0.0796)	-0.657*** (0.0807)	-0.660*** (0.0806)	-0.664*** (0.0806)	-0.659*** (0.0807)	-0.657*** (0.0808)	-0.664*** (0.0796)	
Party ID		-0.156*** (0.0480)	-0.150*** (0.0481)	-0.150*** (0.0481)	-0.151*** (0.0481)	-0.152*** (0.0481)	-0.152*** (0.0475)	
Employed			-0.0506* (0.0286)	-0.0476* (0.0287)	-0.0471 (0.0287)	-0.0475* (0.0287)	-0.0505* (0.0268)	
Children				0.0537 (0.0391)	0.0675* (0.0405)	0.0668* (0.0405)	0.0539 (0.0384)	
Married					0.0314	0.0305		0.0880***

Region					(0.0240)	(0.0241)		(0.0228)
						-0.0173		-0.0222
						(0.0352)		(0.0364)
Observations	967	967	967	967	967	967	967	1,039
R-squared	0.126	0.135	0.138	0.140	0.141	0.141	0.140	0.033

Table 2 reveals a similar pattern to what was observed in Table 1, where no combination or omission/exclusion of any control variable had an effect on the significance level or any major effect on the substantive size of the coefficient for the Negative Image, Approach-Gain message. Across all of the models in Table 2, the effect for the Negative-gains message ranged from 0.335-0.400, with an average treatment effect of 0.366.

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